[Side-note: Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance.] _Sokr._--Whom do you call wise and unwise? Is not the wise man, he who knows what it is proper to say and do--and the unwise man, he who does not know? _Alk._--Yes. _Sokr._--The unwise man will thus often unconsciously say or do what ought not to be said or done? Though not mad like Oedipus, he will nevertheless pray to the Gods for gifts, which will be hurtful to him if obtained. You, for example, would be overjoyed if the Gods were to promise that you should become despot not only over Athens, but also over Greece. _Alk._--Doubtless I should: and every one else would feel as I do. _Sokr._--But what if you were to purchase it with your life, or to damage yourself by the employment of it? _Alk._--Not on those conditions.[29] _Sokr._--But you are aware that many ambitious aspirants, both at Athens and elsewhere (among them, the man who just now killed the Macedonian King Archelaus, and usurped his throne), have acquired power and aggrandisement, so as to be envied by every one: yet have presently found themselves brought to ruin and death by the acquisition. So, also, many persons pray that they may become fathers; but discover presently that their children are the source of so much grief to them, that they wish themselves again childless. Nevertheless, though such reverses are perpetually happening, every one is still not only eager to obtain these supposed benefits, but importunate with the Gods in asking for them. You see that it is not safe even to accept without reflection boons offered to you, much less to pray for boons to be conferred.[30] _Alk._--I see now how much mischief ignorance produces. Every one thinks himself competent to pray for what is beneficial to himself; but ignorance makes him unconsciously imprecate mischief on his own head. [Footnote 29: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141.] [Footnote 30: Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 141-142.] [Side-note: Mistake in predications about ignorance generally. We must discriminate. Ignorance of _what?_ Ignorance of good, is always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always.]