Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2 — John Shaqi
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 2
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
Answer--There is, belonging to each and to both in common,
the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures--upon this
ground they are called beautiful 46
This will not hold--the Profitable is the cause of Good,
and is therefore different from Good--to say that the beautiful is
the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has
been already declared inadmissible _ib._
Remarks upon the Dialogue--the explanations ascribed to
Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates
are attempts to assign some general concept 47
Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to
Sokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the
Memorabilia 49
Concluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and Sokrates 51
Rhetoric against Dialectic 52
Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the
speculative and analytical philosophers _ib._
Concrete Aggregates--abstract or logical Aggregates.
Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician 53
Antithesis of Absolute and Relative, here brought into
debate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty 54
Hippias Minor--characters and situation supposed 55
Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols
Achilles as better than Odysseus--the veracious and straightforward
hero better than the mendacious and crafty 56
This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the
mendacious man are one and the same--the only man who can answer
truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses,
_i. e._ the knowing man--the ignorant man cannot make sure of
doing either the one or the other 57
Analogy of special arts--it is only the arithmetician who
can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses
_ib._
View of Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad. He
thinks that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains
that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent
purpose, whereas Odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose 58
Issue here taken--Sokrates contends that those who hurt,
or cheat, or lie wilfully, are better than those who do the like
unwillingly--he entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his
questions _ib._
Questions of Sokrates--multiplied analogies of the special
arts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly,
whether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well
when he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses 59
It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his
mark only by design, than that of one who misses even when he intends
to hit 60
Dissent and repugnance of Hippias _ib._
Conclusion--That none but the good man can do evil
wilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist
the reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion--Sokrates confesses
his perplexity 61
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