The objector, however, must now be dealt with. He will ask us--Upon what ground do you make so marked a distinction between the pleasures of sight and hearing, and other pleasures? Do you deny that these others (those of taste, smell, eating, drinking, sex) are really pleasures? No, surely (we shall reply); we admit them to be pleasures,--but no one will tolerate us in calling them beautiful: especially the pleasures of sex, which as pleasures are the greatest of all, but which are ugly and disgraceful to behold. He will answer--I understand you: you are ashamed to call these pleasures beautiful, because they do not seem so to the multitude: but I did not ask you, what _seems_ beautiful to the multitude--I asked you, what _is_ beautiful.[28] You mean to affirm, that all pleasures which do not belong to sight and hearing, are not beautiful: Do you mean, all which do not belong to both? or all which do not belong to one or the other? We shall reply--To either one of the two--or to both the two. Well! but, why (he will ask) do you single out these pleasures of sight and hearing, as beautiful exclusively? What is there peculiar in them, which gives them a title to such distinction? All pleasures are alike, so far forth as pleasures, differing only in the more or less. Next, the pleasures of sight cannot be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through sight--for that reason would not apply to the pleasures of hearing: nor again can the pleasures of hearing be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through hearing.[29] We must find something possessed as well by sight as by hearing, common to both, and peculiar to them,--which confers beauty upon the pleasures of both and of each. Any attribute of one, which does not also belong to the other, will not be sufficient for our purpose.[30] Beauty must depend upon some essential characteristic which both have in common.[31] We must therefore look out for some such characteristic, which belongs to both as well as to each separately. [Footnote 28: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 298 E, 299 A. [Greek: Mantha/nô, a)\n i)/sôs phai/ê, kai\ e)gô/, o(/ti pa/lai ai)schu/nesthe tau/tas ta\s ê(dona\s pha/nai kala\s ei)=nai, o(/ti ou) dokei= toi=s a)nthrô/pois; a)ll' e)gô\ ou) tou=to ê)rô/tôn, _o(\ dokei= toi=s polloi=s kalo\n ei)=nai_, a)ll' o(\, _ti e)/stin_.]] [Footnote 29: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 299 D-E.]