[Footnote 30: Plato, Hipp. Maj. 300 B. A separate argument between Sokrates and Hippias is here as it were interpolated; Hippias affirms that he does not see how any predicate can be true of both which is not true of either separately. Sokrates points out that two men are Both, even in number, while each is One, an odd number. You cannot say of the two that they are one, nor can you say of either that he is Both. There are two classes of predicates; some which are true of either but not true of the two together, or _vice versâ_; some again which are true of the two and true also of each one--such as just, wise, handsome, &c. p. 301-303 B.] [Footnote 31: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 302 C. [Greek: tê=| ou)si/a| tê=| e)p' a)mpho/tera e(pome/nê| ô)=|mên, ei)/per a)mpho/tera/ e)sti kala/, tau/tê| dei=n au)ta\ kala\ ei)=nai, tê=| de\ kata\ ta\ e(/tera a)poleipome/nê| mê/. kai\ e(/ti nu=n oi)=omai.]] [Side-note: Answer--There is, belonging to each and to both in common, the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures--upon this ground they are called beautiful.] Now there is one characteristic which may perhaps serve. The pleasures of sight and hearing, both and each, are distinguished from other pleasures by being the most innocuous and the best.[32] It is for this reason that we call them beautiful. The Beautiful, then, is profitable pleasure--or pleasure producing good--for the profitable is, that which produces good.[33] [Footnote 32: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. [Greek: o(/ti a)sine/statai au(=tai tô=n ê(donô=n ei)si kai\ be/ltistai, kai\ a)mpho/terai kai\ e(kate/ra.]] [Footnote 33: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. [Greek: le/gete dê\ to\ kalo\n ei)=nai, _ê(donê\n ô)phe/limon_.]] [Side-note: This will not hold--the Profitable is the cause of Good, and is therefore different from Good--to say that the beautiful is the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has been already declared inadmissible.] Nevertheless the objector will not be satisfied even with this. He will tell us--You declare the Beautiful to be Pleasure producing good. But we before agreed, that the producing agent or cause is different from what is produced or the effect. Accordingly, the Beautiful is different from the good: or, in other words, the Beautiful is not good, nor is the Good beautiful--if each of them is a different thing.[34] Now these propositions we have already pronounced to be inadmissible, so that your present explanation will not stand better than the preceding. [Footnote 34: Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E--304 A. [Greek: Ou)/koun ô)phe/limon, phê/sei, to\ poiou=n ta)gatho/n, to\ de\ poiou=n kai\ to\ poiou/menon, e(/teron nu=n dê\ e)pha/nê, kai\ ei)s to\n pro/teron lo/gon ê(/kei u(mi=n o( lo/gos? _ou)/te ga\r to\ a)gatho\n a)\n ei)/ê kalo\n ou)/te to\ kalo\n a)gatho/n, ei)/per a)/llo au)tô=n e(ka/tero/n e)stin_.]