Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
I subjoin a passage from the work of Professor Bain on Psychology,
where this difficult subject is carefully analysed (The Senses and
the Intellect, p. 370). "There is no possible knowledge of the
world except in reference to our minds. Knowledge means a state of
mind: the knowledge of material things is a mental thing. We are
incapable of discussing the existence of an independent material
world: the very act is a contradiction. We can speak only of a
world presented to our own minds. By an illusion of language we
fancy that we are capable of contemplating a world which does not
enter into our own mental existence: but the attempt belies
itself, for this contemplation is an effort of mind."
"Solidity, extension, space--the foundation properties of the
material world--mean, as has been said above, certain movements
and energies of our own bodies, and exist in our minds in the
shape of feelings of force, allied with visible and tactile, and
other sensible impressions. The sense of the external is the
consciousness of particular energies and activities of our own."
(P. 376). "We seem to have no better way of assuring ourselves and
all mankind, that with the conscious movement of opening the eyes
there will always be a consciousness of light, than by saying that
the light exists as an independent fact, without any eyes to see
it. But if we consider the fact fairly we shall see that this
assertion errs, not simply in being beyond any evidence that we
can have, but also in being a self-contradiction. We are affirming
_that_ to have an existence out of our minds, which we cannot know
but as in our minds. In words we assert independent existence,
while in the very act of doing so we contradict ourselves. Even a
possible world implies a possible mind to conceive it, just as
much as an actual world implies an actual mind. The mistake of the
common modes of expression on this matter is the mistake of
supposing the abstractions of the mind to have a separate and
independent existence. Instead of looking upon the doctrine of an
external and independent world as a generalisation or abstraction
grounded on our particular experiences, summing up the past and
predicting the future, we have got into the way of maintaining the
abstraction to be an independent reality, the foundation, or
cause, or origin, of all these experiences."
To the same purpose Mr. Mansel remarks in his Bampton Lectures on
"The Limits of Religious Thought," page 52:
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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