Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
"A second characteristic of Consciousness is, that it is only
possible in the form of a _relation_. There must be a Subject or
person conscious, and an Object or thing of which he is conscious.
There can be no consciousness without the union of these two
factors; and in that union each exists only as it is related to
the other. The subject is a subject only in so far as it is
conscious of an object: the object is an object only in so far as
it is apprehended by a subject: and the destruction of either is
the destruction of consciousness itself. It is thus manifest that
a consciousness of the Absolute is equally self-contradictory with
that of the Infinite. . . Our whole notion of Existence is
necessarily relative, for it is existence as conceived by us. But
_Existence_, as we conceive it, is but a name for the several ways
in which objects are presented to our consciousness--a general
term embracing a variety of relations. . . To assume Absolute
Existence as an object of thought is thus to suppose a relation
existing when the related terms exist no longer. An object of
thought exists, as such, in and through its relation to a thinker;
while the Absolute, as such, is independent of all relation."
Dr. Henry More has also a passage asserting the essential
correlation on which I am here insisting (Immortality of the Soul,
ch. ii. p. 3). And Professor Ferrier, in his Institutes of
Metaphysic, has given much valuable elucidation respecting the
essential relativity of cognition.
Though this note is already long, I shall venture to add from an
eminent German critic--Trendelenburg--a passage which goes to the
same point.
"Das Sein ist als die absolute Position erklärt worden. Der
Begriff des Seins drücke blos das aus: es werde bei dem einfachen
Setzen eines _Was_ sein Bewenden haben. Es hat sich hier die
abstracte Vorstellung des Seins nur in eine verwandte Anschauung
umgekleidet; denn das Gesetzte steht in dem Raum da; und insofern
fordert die absolute Position schon den Begriff des seiendem
Etwas, das gesetzt wird. _Fragt man weiter, so ist in der
absoluten Position schon derjenige mitgedacht, der da setzt._ Das
Sein wird also _nicht unabhängig aus sich selbst bestimmt_,
sondern zur Erklärung _ein Verhältniss zu der Thätigkeit des
Gedankens herbeigezogen_.
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