Difficulties about Unum et Multa. How can the One be Many? How can the Many be One? The difficulties are greatest about Generic Unity--how it is distributed among species and individuals _ib._ Active disputes upon this question at the time 340 Order of Nature--Coalescence of the Finite with the Infinite. The One--The Finite Many--The Infinite Many _ib._ Mistake commonly made--To look only for the One, and the Infinite Many, without looking for the intermediate subdivisions 341 Illustration from Speech and Music 342 Plato's explanation does not touch the difficulties which he had himself recognised as existing 343 It is nevertheless instructive, in regard to logical division and classification 344 At that time little thought had been bestowed upon classification as a logical process _ib._ Classification--unconscious and conscious 345 Plato's doctrine about classification is not necessarily connected with his Theory of Ideas _ib._ Quadruple distribution of Existences. 1. The Infinite. 2. The Finient 3. Product of the two former. 4. Combining Cause or Agency 346 Pleasure and Pain belong to the first of these four Classes--Cognition or Intelligence belongs to the fourth 347 In the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence with Pleasure, Intelligence is the more important of the two constituents _ib._ Intelligence is the regulating principle--Pleasure is the Indeterminate, requiring to be regulated 348 Pleasure and Pain must be explained together--Pain arises from the disturbance of the fundamental harmony of the system--Pleasure from the restoration of it _ib._ Pleasure presupposes Pain 349 Derivative pleasures of memory and expectation belonging to mind alone. Here you may find pleasure without pain _ib._ A life of Intelligence alone, without pain and without pleasure, is conceivable. Some may prefer it: at any rate it is second-best _ib._ Desire belongs to the mind, presupposes both a bodily want, and the memory of satisfaction previously had for it. The mind and body are here opposed. No true or pure pleasure therein 350 Can pleasures be true or false? Sokrates maintains that they are so 351 Reasons given by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true opinions, are true pleasures. The just man is favoured by the Gods, and will have true visions sent to him _ib._ Protarchus disputes this--He thinks that there are some pleasures bad, but none false--Sokrates does not admit this, but reserves the question 352 No means of truly estimating pleasures and pains--False estimate habitual--These are the false pleasures _ib._ Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and gradual changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as pleasure or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure 353 Opinion of the pleasure-hating philosophers--That pleasure is no reality, but a mere juggle. There is no reality except pain, and the relief from pain 354