Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
In an Appendix to this Dissertation, contained in the same volume
(p. 608), Sir W. Hamilton not only re-asserts the doctrine ("Our
whole knowledge of mind and matter is relative,
conditioned--relatively conditioned. Of things absolutely or in
themselves, be they external, be they internal, we know nothing, or
know them only as incognisable," &c.)--but affirms farther that
philosophers of every school, with the exception of a few late absolute
theorisers in Germany, have always held and harmoniously re-echoed
the same doctrine.
In proof of such unanimous agreement, he cites passages from
seventeen different philosophers.
The first name on his list stands as follows:--"1. Protagoras--(as
reported by Plato, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius,
&c.)--Man is (for himself) the measure of all things".
Sir William Hamilton understands the Protagorean doctrine as I
understand it, and as I have endeavoured to represent it in the
present chapter. It has been very generally misconceived.
I cannot, however, agree with Sir William Hamilton, in thinking
that this theory respecting the Unconditioned and the Absolute,
has been the theory generally adopted by philosophers. The
passages which he cites from other authors are altogether
insufficient to prove such an affirmation.]
[Footnote 46: Plato, Theætêt. p. 156 A. [Greek: tê=s de\ kinê/seôs
du/o ei)/dê, plê/thei me\n a)/peiron e(ka/teron, du/namin de\ to\
me\n poiei=n e)/chon, to\ de\ pa/schein.]]
[Footnote 47: In that distinction, upon which Aristotle lays so
much stress, between Actus and Potentia, he declares Actus or
actuality to be the Prius--Potentia or potentiality to be the
Posterius. See Metaphysica, [Greek: Th]. 8, 1049, b. 5 seqq.; De
Animâ, ii. 4, 415, a. 17. The Potential is a derivative from the
Actual--derived by comparison, abstraction, and logical analysis:
a Mental concept, helping us to describe, arrange, and reason
about, the multifarious acts of sense or consciousness--but not an
anterior generating reality.
Turgot observes (OEuvres, vol. iii. pp. 108-110; Article in the
Encyclopédie, _Existence_):--
"Le premier fondement de la notion de l'_existence_ est la
conscience de notre propre sensation, et le sentiment du _moi_ qui
résulte de cette conscience. La relation nécessaire entre l'être
appercevant, et l'être apperçu considéré hors du _moi_, suppose
dans les deux termes la même réalité. Il y a dans l'un et dans
l'autre un fondement de cette relation, que l'homme, s'il avoit un
langage, pourroit désigner par le nom commun d'_existence_ ou de
_présence_: car ces deux notions ne seroient point encore
distinguées l'une de l'autre. . . .
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