Some men (says Sokrates) have learnt,--have bestowed study on special matters,--have made themselves wise upon those matters. Others have not done the like, but remain ignorant. It is the wise man only who is a measure: the ignorant man neither is so, nor believes himself to be so, but seeks guidance from the wise.[66] [Footnote 66: Plato, Theætêt. pp. 171 C, 179 B.] Upon this we may remark--First, that even when the untaught men are all put aside, and the erudites or Experts remain alone--still these very erudites or Experts, the men of special study, are perpetually differing among themselves; so that we cannot recognise one as a measure, without repudiating the authority of the rest.[67] If by a measure, Plato means an infallible measure, he will not find it in this way: he is as far from the absolute as before. Next, it is perfectly correct that if any man be known to have studied or acquired experience on special matters, his opinion obtains an authority with others (more or fewer), such as the opinion of an ignorant man will not possess. This is a real difference between the graduated man and the non-graduated. But it is a difference not contradicting the theory of Protagoras; who did not affirm that every man's opinion was equally trustworthy in the estimation of others, but that every man's opinion was alike a measure to the man himself. The authority of the guide resides in the belief and opinion of those who follow him, or who feel prepared to follow him if necessity arises. A man gone astray on his journey, asks the way to his destination from residents whom he believes to know it, just as he might look at a compass, or at the stars, if no other persons were near. In following their direction, he is acting on his own belief, that he himself is ignorant on the point in question and that they know. He is a measure to himself, both of the extent of his own ignorance, and of the extent of his own knowledge. And in this respect all are alike--every man, woman, child, and animal;[68] though they are by no means alike in the estimation of others, as trustworthy authorities. [Footnote 67: "Nam, quod dicunt omnino, se credere ei quem judicent fuisse sapientem--probarem, si id ipsum rudes et indocti judicare potuissent (statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maximé videtur esse sapientis). _Sed, ut potuerint, potuerunt, omnibus rebus auditis, cognitis etiam reliquorum sententiis: judicaverunt autem re semel auditâ, atque ad unius se auctoritatem contulerunt._" (Cicero, Acad. Priora, ii. 3, 9.)] [Footnote 68: Plato, Theætêt. p. 171 E. I transcribe the following from the treatise of Fichte (Beruf des Menschen, Destination de l'Homme; Traduction de Barchou de Penhoën, ch. i. Le Doute, pp. 54-55):--