Occasionally indeed Aristotle partitions the soul between [Greek: nou=s] and [Greek: o)/rexis]--Intelligence and Appetite--recognising Sense as belonging to the head of Intelligence--see De Motu Animalium, 6, p. 700, b. 20. [Greek: tau=ta de\ pa/nta a)na/getai ei)s nou=n kai\ o)/rexin; kai\ ga\r ê( phantasi/a kai\ ê( ai)/sthêsis tê\n au)tê\n tô=| nô=| chô/ran e)/chousi; _kritika\ ga\r pa/nta_.] Compare also the Topica, ii. 4, p. 111, a. 18. It will thus be seen that while Plato severs pointedly [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] from anything like discrimination, comparison, judgment, even in the most rudimentary form--Aristotle refuses to adopt this extreme abstraction as his basis for classifying the mental phenomena. He recognises a certain measure of discrimination, comparison, and judgment, as implicated in sensible perceptions. Moreover, that which he calls [Greek: koinê\ ai)/sthêsis] is unknown to Plato, who isolates each sense, and indeed each act of each sense, as much as possible. Aristotle is opposed, as Plato is, to the doctrine [Greek: E)pistê/mê = Ai)/sthêsis], but he employs a different manner of reasoning against it. See, _inter alia_, Anal. Poster. i. 31, p. 87, b. 28. He confines [Greek: e)pistê/mê] to one branch of the [Greek: noêtikê/]. The Peripatetic Straton, the disciple of Theophrastus, denied that there was any distinct line of demarcation between [Greek: to\ ai)stha/nesthai] and [Greek: to\ noei=n]: maintaining that the former was impossible without a certain measure of the latter. His observation is very worthy of note. Plutarch, De Solertiâ Animalium, iii. 6, p. 961 A. [Greek: Kai/toi Stra/tôno/s ge tou= phusikou= lo/gos e)sti/n, a)podeiknu/ôn ô(s ou)d' ai)stha/nesthai topara/pan a)/neu tou= noei=n u(pa/rchei; kai\ ga\r gra/mmata polla/kis e)piporeuo/mena tê=| o)/psei, kai\ lo/goi prospi/ptontes tê=| a)koiê=| _dialantha/nousin ê(ma=s_ kai\ _diapheu/gousi pro\s e(te/rois to\n nou=n e)/chontas_; ei)=t' _au)=this e)panê=lthe_ kai\ _metathei= kai\ metadiô/kei tô=n proïeme/nôn e(/kaston a)nalego/menos_; ê(=| kai\ le/lektai. _Nou=s o(rê=|, kai\ nou=s a)kou/ei, ta\ de\ a)/lla kôpha\ kai\ tuphla/_;** ô(s tou= peri\ ta\ o)/mmata kai\ ô)=ta pa/thous, a)\n mê\ parê=| to\ phronou=n, ai)/sthêsin ou) poiou=ntos.] Straton here notices that remarkable fact (unnoticed by Plato and even by Aristotle, so far as I know) in the process of association, that impressions of sense are sometimes unheeded when they occur, but force themselves upon the attention afterwards, and are recalled by the mind in the order in which they occurred at first.]