[Footnote 100: Plato, Theæt. p. 187 A. _Sokr._ [Greek: o(/môs de\ tosou=to/n ge probebê/kamen, ô(/ste mê\ zêtei=n au)tê\n (e)pistê/mên) e)n ai)sthê/sei topara/pan, a)ll' e)n e)kei/nô| tô=| o)no/mati, o(/, ti pot' e)/chei ê( psuchê/, o(/tan au)tê\ kath' au(tê\n pragmateu/êtai peri\ ta\ o)/nta.] _Theæt._ [Greek: A)lla\ mê\n tou=to/ ge kalei=tai, ô(s e)gô)=|mai, _doxa/zein_.] _Sokr._ [Greek: O)rthô=s ga\r oi)/ei.] Plato is quite right in distinguishing between [Greek: ai)/sthêsis] and [Greek: do/xa], looking at the point as a question of psychological classification. It appears to me, however, most probable that those who maintained the theory [Greek: E)pistê/mê = Ai)/sthêsis], made no such distinction, but included that which he calls [Greek: do/xa] in [Greek: ai)/sthêsis]. Unfortunately we do not possess their own exposition; but it cannot have included much of psychological analysis.] [Footnote 101: Schleiermacher represents Plato as discriminating Knowledge (the region of infallibility, you either possess it or not) from Opinion (the region of fallibility, true or false, as the case may be) by a broad and impassable line-- "Auch hieraus erwächst eine sehr entscheidende, nur ebenfalls nicht ausdrücklich gezogene, Folgerung, dass die reine Erkenntniss gar nicht auf demselben Gebiet liegen könne mit dem Irrthum--und es in Beziehung auf sie kein Wahr und Falsch gebe, sondern nur ein Haben oder Nicht Haben." (Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Theæt. p. 176.) Steinhart (in his Einleit. zum Theæt. p. 94) contests this opinion of Schleiermacher (though he seems to give the same opinion himself, p. 92). He thinks that Plato does not recognise so very marked a separation between Knowledge and Opinion: that he considers Knowledge as the last term of a series of mental processes, developed gradually according to constant laws, and ascending from Sensible Perception through Opinion to Knowledge: that the purpose of the Theætêtus is to illustrate this theory. Ueberweg, on the contrary, defends the opinion of Schleiermacher and maintains that Steinhart is mistaken (Aechtheit und Zeit. Platon. Schriften, p. 279).