[Footnote 130: Plato, Theætêt. p. 210 B. [Greek: ou)kou=n tau=ta me\n a(/panta ê( maieutikê\ ê(mi=n te/chnê a)nemiai=a/ phêsi gegenê=sthai kai\ ou)k a)/xia trophê=s?]] [Footnote 131: Plato, Theæt. p. 210 C. [Greek: e)a/n te gi/gnê| (e)gku/môn), beltio/nôn e)/sei plê/rês dia\ tê\n nu=n e)xe/tasin; e)a/n te keno\s ê)=s, ê(=tton e)/sei baru\s toi=s sunou=si kai\ ê(merô/teros, sôphro/nôs ou)k oi)o/menos ei)de/nai a(\ mê\ oi)=stha.] Compare also an earlier passage in the dialogue, p. 187 B.] * * * * * [Side-note: Remarks on the dialogue. View of Plato. False persuasion of knowledge removed. Importance of such removal.] The concluding observations of this elaborate dialogue deserve particular attention as illustrating Plato's point of view, at the time when he composed the Theætêtus. After a long debate, set forth with all the charm of Plato's style, no result is attained. Three different explanations of knowledge have been rejected as untenable.[132] No other can be found; nor is any suggestion offered, showing in what quarter we are to look for the true one. What then is the purpose or value of the dialogue? Many persons would pronounce it to be a mere piece of useless ingenuity and elegance: but such is not the opinion of Plato himself. Sufficient gain (in his view) will have been ensured, if Theætêtus has acquired a greater power of testing any fresh explanation which he may attempt of this difficult subject: or even if he should attempt none such, by his being disabused, at all events, of the false persuasion of knowing where he is really ignorant. Such false persuasion of knowledge (Plato here intimates) renders a man vexatious to associates; while a right estimate of his own knowledge and ignorance fosters gentleness and moderation of character. In this view, false persuasion of knowledge is an ethical defect, productive of positive mischief in a man's intercourse with others: the removal of it improves his character, even though no ulterior step towards real and positive knowledge be made. The important thing is, that he should acquire the power of testing and verifying all opinions, old as well as new. This, which is the only guarantee against the delusive self-satisfaction of sham knowledge, must be firmly established in the mind before it is possible to aspire effectively to positive and assured knowledge. The negative arm of philosophy is in its application prior to the positive, and indispensable, as the single protection against error and false persuasion of knowledge. Sokrates is here depicted as one in whom the negative vein is spontaneous and abundant, even to a pitch of discomfort--as one complaining bitterly, that objections thrust themselves upon him, unsought and unwelcome, against conclusions which he had himself just previously taken pains to prove at length.[133]