If the Sophists professed to be encyclopedists, this was an error natural to the age; and was the character of Grecian philosophy generally, even in its most illustrious manifestations. [Footnote 98: Plato, Sophistês, p. 233 C. [Greek: doxastikê\n a)/ra tina\ peri\ pa/ntôn e)pistê/mên o( sophistê\s ê(mi=n, a)ll' ou)k a)lêthei/an e)/chôn a)nape/phantai.] 234 B: [Greek: mimê/mata kai\ o(mô/numa tô=n o)/ntôn.] When the Eleate here says about the Sophists (p. 233 B), [Greek: dokou=si pro\s tau=ta e)pistêmo/nôs e)/chein au)toi\ pro\s a(/per a)ntile/gousin], this is exactly what Sokrates, in the Platonic Apology, tells us about the impression made by his own dialectics or refutative conversation, Plato, Apolog. p. 23 A. [Greek: e)k tau/têsi dê\ tê=s e)xeta/seôs pollai\ me\n a)pe/chtheiai/ moi gego/nasi kai\ oi(=ai chalepô/tatai kai\ baru/tatai, ô(/ste polla\s diabola\s a)p' au)tô=n gegone/nai, o)/noma/ te tou=to le/gesthai, sopho\s ei)=nai; oi)=ontai ga/r me e(ka/stoth' oi( paro/ntes tau=t' ei)=nai sopho\n a(\ a)\n a)/llon e)xele/gxô.]] [Side-note: Inconsistency of Plato's argument in the Sophistês. He says that the Sophist is a disputatious man who challenges every one for speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who maintains false propositions to be impossible.] Having traced the Sophist down to the character of a man of delusion and imposture, passing off appearance as if it were reality, and falsehood as if it were truth--Plato (as we have seen) suddenly turns round upon himself, and asks how such a character is possible. He represents the Sophist as maintaining that no man could speak falsely[99]--that a false proposition was self-contradictory, inasmuch as Non-Ens was inconceivable and unutterable. I do not see how the argument which Plato here ascribes to the Sophist, can be reconciled with the character which he had before given of the Sophist--as a man who passed his life in disputation and controversy; which involves the perpetual arraigning of other men's opinions as false. A professed disputant may perhaps be accused of admitting nothing to be true: but he cannot well be charged with maintaining that nothing is false. [Footnote 99: Plato, Sophist. pp. 240-241. Compare 260 E.] [Side-note: Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens--No predications except identical.]