Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 3
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
To pass over this inconsistency, however--the reasoning of Plato
himself on the subject of Non-Ens is an interesting relic of
ancient speculation. He has made for himself an opportunity of
canvassing, not only the doctrine of Parmenides, who emphatically
denied Non-Ens--but also the opposite doctrine of other schools.
He farther comments upon a different opinion, advanced by other
philosophers--That no proposition can be admitted, in which the
predicate is different from the subject: That no proposition is
true or valid, except an identical proposition. You cannot say,
Man is good: you can only say, Man is Man, or Good is good. You
cannot say--Sokrates is good, brave, old, stout, flat-nosed, &c.,
because you thereby multiply the one Sokrates into many. One thing
cannot be many, nor many things one.[100]
[Footnote 100: Plato, Sophist. p. 251 B-C. Compare Plato, Philêbus,
p. 14 C.]
[Side-note: Misconception of the function of the copula in
predication.]
This last opinion is said to have been held by Antisthenes, one of
the disciples of Sokrates. We do not know how he explained or
defended it, nor what reserves he may have admitted to qualify it.
Plato takes no pains to inform us on this point. He treats the
opinion with derision, as an absurdity. We may conceive it as one
of the many errors arising from a misconception of the purpose and
function of the copula in predication. Antisthenes probably
considered that the copula implied identity between the predicate
and the subject. Now the explanation or definition of _man_ is
different from the explanation or definition of _good_:
accordingly, if you say, Man is good, you predicate identity
between two different things: as if you were to say Two is Three,
or Three is Four. And if the predicates were multiplied, the
contradiction became aggravated, because then you predicated
identity not merely between one thing and another different thing,
but between one thing and many different things. The opinion of
Antisthenes depends upon two assumptions--That each separate word,
whether used as subject or as predicate, denotes a Something
separate and existent by itself: That the copula implies identity.
Now the first of these two assumptions is not unfrequently
admitted, even in the reasonings of Plato, Aristotle, and many
others: while the latter is not more remarkable than various other
erroneous conceptions which have been entertained, as to the
function of the copula.
[Side-note: No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No
analysis or classification of propositions before the works of
Aristotle.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account