First, in the Phædrus and Phædon (also in the Timæus and elsewhere), the pre-existence of the soul, and its antecedent familiarity, greater or less, with the world of Ideas,--are brought into the foreground; so as to furnish a basis for that doctrine of reminiscence, which is one of the peculiar characteristics of Plato. The Form or Idea, when once disengaged from the appendages by which it has been overgrown, is said to be recognised by the mind and welcomed as an old acquaintance. But in the Symposion, no such doctrine is found. The mind is described as rising by gradual steps from the concrete and particular to the abstract and general, by recognising the sameness of one attribute as pervading many particulars, and by extending its comparisons from smaller groups of particulars to larger; until at length one and the same attribute is perceived to belong to all. The mind is supposed to evolve out of itself, and to generate in some companion mind, certain abstract or general conceptions, correlating with the Forms or Concepta without. The fundamental postulate here is, not that of pre-existence, but that of in-dwelling conceptions. [Side-note: Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposion.] Secondly, in the Phædrus and Phædon, the soul is declared to be immortal, _à parte post_ as well as _à parte ante_. But in the Symposion, this is affirmed to be impossible.[38] The soul yearns for, but is forbidden to reach, immortality: or at least can only reach immortality in a metaphorical sense, by its prolific operation--by generating in itself as long as it lasts, and in other minds who will survive it, a self-renewing series of noble thoughts and feelings--by leaving a name and reputation to survive in the memory of others. [Footnote 38: Plato, Sympos. pp. 207-208.] [Side-note: Form or Idea of Beauty presented singly and exclusively in Symposion.] Thirdly, in Phædrus, Phædon, Republic, and elsewhere, Plato recognises many distinct Forms or Ideas--a world or aggregate of such Entia Rationis[39]--among which Beauty is one, but only one. It is the exalted privilege of the philosophic mind to come into contemplation and cognition of these Forms generally. But in the Symposion, the Form of Beauty ([Greek: to\ kalo\n]) is presented singly and exclusively--as if the communion with this one Form were the sole occupation of the most exalted philosophy. [Footnote 39: Plat. Repub. v. 476. He recognises Forms of [Greek: a)/dikon, kako/n, ai)schro/n], as well as Forms of [Greek: di/kaion, a)gatho/n, kalo/n], &c.] [Side-note: Eros recognised, both in Phædrus and Symposion, as affording the initiatory stimulus to philosophy--Not so recognised in Phædon, Theætêtus, and elsewhere.]