6. Again, if there be a real self-existent Form of Cognition, apart from that which we or others possess--it must doubtless be far superior in accuracy and perfection to that which we possess.[21] The Form of Beauty and the other Forms, must be in like manner superior to that which is found under the same name in individual objects. This perfect Form of Cognition must therefore belong to the Gods, if it belong to any one. But if so, the Gods must have a Form of Truth, the proper object of their Form of Cognition. They cannot know the truth relatively to us, which belongs to _our_ cognition--any more than we can know the more perfect truth belonging to them. So too about other Forms. The perfect Form of mastership belongs to the Gods, correlating with its proper Form of servantship. _Their_ mastership does not correlate with individual objects like us: in other words, they are not our masters, nor are we their servants. _Their_ cognition, again, does not correlate with individual objects like us: in other words, they do not know us, nor do we know them. In like manner, we in our capacity of masters are not masters of them--we as cognizant beings know nothing of them or of that which they know. They can in no way correlate with us, nor can we correlate with them.[22] [Footnote 21: An argument very similar is urged by Aristotle (Metaph. [Greek: Th]. 1050, b. 34) [Greek: ei) a)/ra tine/s ei)si phu/seis toiau=tai ê)\ ou)si/ai oi(/as le/gousin oi( e)n toi=s lo/gois ta\s i)de/as, polu\ ma=llon e)pistê=mon a)/n ti ei)/ê ê( au)toepistê/mê kai\ kinou/menon ê( ki/nêsis.]] [Footnote 22: Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 A. [Greek: Tau=ta me\ntoi, ô)= Sô/krates, e)/phê o( Parmeni/dês, _kai\ e)/ti a)/lla pro\s tou/tois pa/nu polla\ a)nagkai=on e)/chein ta\ ei)/dê_, ei) ei)si\n au)tai ai( i)de/ai tô=n o)/ntôn], &c.] [Side-note: Sum total of objections against the Ideas is grave. But if we do not admit that Ideas exist, and that they are knowable, there can be no dialectic discussion.] Here are some of the objections, Sokrates (concludes Parmenides), which beset your doctrine, that there exist substantive, self-standing, Forms of Ideas, each respectively definable. Many farther objections might also be urged.[23] So that a man may reasonably maintain, either that none such exist--or that, granting their existence, they are essentially unknowable by us. He must put forth great ingenuity to satisfy himself of the affirmative; and still more wonderful ingenuity to find arguments for the satisfaction of others, respecting this question.