[Footnote 23: Plato, Parmenid. p. 134 D-E. [Greek: Ou)/koun ei) para\ tô=| theô=| au(/tê e)/stin ê( a)kribesta/tê despotei/a kai\ au(/tê ê( a)kribesta/tê e)pistê/mê, ou)/t' a)\n ê( despotei/a ê( e)kei/nôn] (i.e. [Greek: tô=n theô=n]) [Greek: ê(mô=n pote\ a)\n despo/seien, _ou)/t' a)\n ê( e)pistê/mê ê(ma=s gnoi/ê ou)de/ ti a)/llo tô=n par' ê(mi=n_; a)lla\ o(moi/ôs ê(mei=s t' e)kei/nôn ou)k a)/rchomen tê=| par' ê(mi=n a)rchê=|, ou)de gignô/skomen tou= thei/ou ou)de\n tê=| ê(mete/ra| e)pistê/mê, _e)kei=noi/ te au)=_] (sc. [Greek: oi( theoi/]) [Greek: kata\ to\n au)to\n lo/gon ou)/te despo/tai ê(mô=n ei)si\n _ou)/te gignô/skousi ta\ a)nthrô/peia pra/gmata theoi\ o)/ntes_. A)lla\ mê\ li/an, e)/phê] (Sokrates), [Greek: ê)=| thaumasto\s o( lo/gos, ei)/ tis theo\n a)posterê/seis tou= ei)de/nai.] The inference here drawn by Parmenides supplies the first mention of a doctrine revived by (if not transmitted to) Averroes and various scholastic doctors of the middle ages, so as to be formally condemned by theological councils. M. Renan tells us--"En 1269, Étienne Tempier, évêque de Paris, ayant rassemblé le conseil des maîtres en théologie . . . condamna, de concert avec eux, treize propositions qui ne sont presque toutes que les axiomes familiers de l'averroïsme: Quod intellectus hominum est unus et idem numero. Quod mundus est æternus. Quod nunquam fuit primus homo. _Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia_," &c. (Renan, Averroès, p. 213, 2nd ed., p. 268.)] Nevertheless, on the other side (continues Parmenides), unless we admit the existence of such Forms or Ideas--substantive, eternal, unchangeable, definable--philosophy and dialectic discussion are impossible.[24] [Footnote 24: Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 B.] * * * * * [Side-note: Dilemma put by Parmenides--Acuteness of his objections.] Here then, Parmenides entangles himself and his auditors in the perplexing dilemma, that philosophical and dialectic speculation is impossible, unless these Forms or Ideas, together with the participation of sensible objects in them, be granted; while at the same time this cannot be granted, until objections, which appear at first sight unanswerable, have been disposed of. The acuteness with which these objections are enforced, is remarkable. I know nothing superior to it in all the Platonic writings. Moreover the objections point directly against that doctrine which Plato in other dialogues most emphatically insists upon, and which Aristotle both announces and combats as characteristic of Plato--the doctrine of separate, self-existent, absolute, Forms or Ideas. They are addressed moreover to Sokrates, the chief exponent of that doctrine here as well as in other dialogues. And he is depicted as unable to meet them. [Side-note: The doctrine which Parmenides attacks is the genuine Platonic theory of Ideas. His objections are never answered in any part of the Platonic dialogues.]