to bear upon him, is, that it is essential in the first instance for the comfort and security of others: in the second instance for his own. In Plato's theory, the first consideration is omitted, while not only the whole stress is laid upon the second, but more is promised in regard to the second than the reality warrants. [Footnote 22: Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 663-664.] The opponents whom the Platonic Sokrates here seeks to confute held--That Justice is an obligation in itself onerous to the agent, but indispensable in order to ensure to him just dealing and estimation from others--That injustice is a path in itself easy and inviting to the agent, but necessary to be avoided, because he forfeits his chance of receiving justice from others, and draws upon himself hatred and other evil consequences. This doctrine (argues Plato) represents the advantages of justice to the just agent as arising, not from his actually being just, but from his seeming to be so, and being reputed by others to be so: in like manner, it represents the misery of injustice to the unjust agent as arising not from his actually being unjust, but from his being reputed to be so by others. The inference which a man will naturally draw from hence (adds Plato) is, That he must aim only at seeming to be just, not at being just in reality: that he must seek to avoid the reputation of injustice, not injustice in reality: that the mode of life most enviable is, to be unjust in reality, but just in seeming--to study the means either of deceiving others into a belief that you are just, or of coercing others into submission to your injustice.[23] This indeed cannot be done unless you are strong or artful: it you are weak or simple-minded, the best thing which you can do is to be just. The weak alone are gainers by justice: the strong are losers by it, and gainers by injustice.[24] [Footnote 23: Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 362-367.] [Footnote 24: Plato, Republic, ii. p. 366 C.] These are legitimate corollaries (so Glaukon and Adeimantus are here made to argue) from the doctrine preached by most fathers to their children, that the obligations of justice are in themselves onerous to the just agent, and remunerative only so far as they determine just conduct on the part of others towards him. Plato means, not that fathers, in exhorting their children, actually drew these corollaries: but that if they followed out their own doctrine consistently, they would have drawn them: and that there is no way of escaping them, except by adopting the doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates--That justice is in itself a source of happiness to the just agent, and injustice a source of misery to the unjust agent--however each of them may be esteemed or treated by others. [Side-note: A Reciprocity of rights and duties between men in social life--different feelings towards one and towards the other.]