Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4Grote, George
Philosophy
Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates, 3rd ed. Volume 4
Grote, George
Philosophy, Ancient; Plato; Socrates, 470 BC-399 BC
[Side-note: Correction by Thrasymachus--if the Ruler
mistakes, he is _pro tanto_ no Ruler--The Ruler, _quâ_
Ruler--_quâ_ Craftsman--is infallible.]
Thrasymachus might have replied to this objection by saying, that
he meant what the superior power conceived to be for its own
advantage, and enacted accordingly, whether such conception was
correct or erroneous. This interpretation, though indicated by a
remark put into the mouth of Kleitophon, is not farther
pursued.[18] But in the reply really ascribed to Thrasymachus, he
is made to retract what he had just before admitted--that the
superior authority sometimes commits mistakes. In so far as a
superior or a ruler makes mistakes (Thrasymachus says), he is not
a superior. We say, indeed, speaking loosely, that the ruler falls
into error, just as we say that the physician or the steersman
falls into error. The physician does not err _quâ_ physician,
nor the steersman _quâ_ steersman. No craftsman errs
_quâ_ craftsman. If he errs, it is not from his craft, but
from want of knowledge: that is, from want of craft.[19] What the
ruler, as such, declares to be best for himself, and therefore
enacts, is always really best for himself: this is justice for the
persons under his rule.
[Footnote 18: Plato, Republic, i. p. 340 B.]
[Footnote 19: Plato, Republic, i. p. 340 E. [Greek: e)pilipou/sês
ga\r e)pistê/mês o( a(marta/nôn a(marta/nei, e)n ô(=| ou)/k e)sti
dêmiourgo/s; ô(/ste dêmiourgo\s ê)\ sopho\s ê)\ a)/rchôn ou)dei\s
a(marta/nei to/te o(/tan a)/rchôn ê)=|.]]
[Side-note: Reply by Sokrates--The Ruler, _quâ_
infallible Craftsman, studies the interest of those whom he
governs, and not his own interest.]
To this subtle distinction, Sokrates replies by saying (in
substance), "If you take the craftsman in this strict meaning, as
representing the abstraction Craft, it is not true that his
proceedings are directed towards his own interest or advantage.
What he studies is, the advantage of his subjects or clients,
not his own. The physician, as such, has it in view to cure his
patients: the steersman, to bring his passengers safely to
harbour: the ruler, so far forth as craftsman, makes laws for the
benefit of his subjects, and not for his own. If obedience to
these laws constitutes justice, therefore, it is not true that
justice consists in what is advantageous to the superior or
governing power. It would rather consist in what is advantageous
to the governed."[20]
[Footnote 20: Plato, Republic, i. p. 342.]
[Side-note: Thrasymachus denies this--Justice is the good of
another. The just many are worse off than the unjust One, and are
forced to submit to his superior strength.]
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