Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
Now between entirely indivisible ("Being") which occupies the first
rank amidst intelligible beings, and the (essence) which is entirely
divisible in its sense-objects, there is, above the sense-world,
near it, and within it, a "being" of another nature, which is not,
like bodies, completely divisible, but which, nevertheless, becomes
divisible within bodies. Consequently, when you separate bodies, the
form within them also divides, but in such a way that it remains entire
in each part. This identical (essence), thus becoming manifold, has
parts that are completely separated from each other; for it then is a
divisible form, such as colors, and all the qualities, like any form
which can simultaneously remain entire in several things entirely
separate, at a distance, and foreign to each other because of the
different ways in which they are affected. We must therefore admit that
this form (that resides in bodies) is also divisible.
BY PROCESSION THE SOUL CONNECTS THE TWO.
Thus the absolutely divisible (essence) does not exist alone; there is
another one located immediately beneath it, and derived from it. On
one hand, this inferior (essence) participates in the indivisibility
of its principle; on the other, it descends towards another nature by
its procession. Thereby it occupies a position intermediary between
indivisible and primary (essence), (that is, intelligence), and the
divisible (essence) which is in the bodies. Besides it is not in the
same condition of existence as color and the other qualities; for
though the latter be the same in all corporeal masses, nevertheless the
quality in one body is completely separate from that in another, just
as physical masses themselves are separate from each other. Although
(by its essence) the magnitude of these bodies be one, nevertheless
that which thus is identical in each part does not exert that community
of affection which constitutes sympathy,[355] because to identity is
added difference. This is the case because identity is only a simple
modification of bodies, and not a "being." On the contrary, the nature
that approaches the absolutely indivisible "Being" is a genuine "being"
(such as is the soul). It is true that she unites with the bodies and
consequently divides with them; but that happens to her only when she
communicates herself to the bodies. On the other hand, when she unites
with the bodies, even with the greatest and most extended of all (the
world), she does not cease to be one, although she yield herself up to
it entirely.
DIVISION AS THE PROPERTY OF BODIES, BUT NOT THE CHARACTERISTIC OF SOUL.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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