Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
In no way does the unity of this essence resemble that of the body;
for the unity of the body consists in the unity of parts, of which
each is different from the others, and occupies a different place. Nor
does the unity of the soul bear any closer resemblance to the unity of
the qualities. Thus this nature that is simultaneously divisible and
indivisible, and that we call soul is not one in the sense of being
continuous (of which each part is external to every other); it is
divisible, because it animates all the parts of the body it occupies,
but is indivisible because it entirely inheres in the whole body, and
in each of its parts.[356] When we thus consider the nature of the
soul, we see her magnitude and power, and we understand how admirable
and divine are these and superior natures. Without any extension, the
soul is present throughout the whole of extension; she is present in a
location, though she be not present therein.[357] She is simultaneously
divided and undivided, or rather, she is never really divided, and she
never really divides; for she remains entire within herself. If she
seem to divide, it is not in relation with the bodies, which, by virtue
of their own divisibility, cannot receive her in an indivisible manner.
Thus division is the property of the body, but not the characteristic
of the soul.
SOUL AS BOTH ESSENTIALLY DIVISIBLE AND INDIVISIBLE.
2. Such then the nature of the soul had to be. She could not be either
purely indivisible, nor purely divisible, but she necessarily had to be
both indivisible and divisible, as has just been set forth. This is
further proved by the following considerations. If the soul, like the
body, have several parts differing from each other, the sensation of
one part would not involve a similar sensation in another part. Each
part of the soul, for instance, that which inheres in the finger, would
feel its individual affections, remaining foreign to all the rest,
while remaining within itself. In short, in each one of us would inhere
several managing souls (as said the Stoics).[358] Likewise, in this
universe, there would be not one single soul (the universal Soul), but
an infinite number of souls, separated from each other.
POLEMIC AGAINST THE STOIC PREDOMINATING PART OF THE SOUL.
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