The most irrational theory of all is that an aggregation of molecules should produce life, that elements without intelligence should beget intelligence. Others (like Alexander of Aphrodisia) insist that to produce life these elements must be mingled in a certain manner. That would, however, imply (as thought Gallen and Hippocrates[38]) the existence of a principle which produces order, and which should be the cause of mixture or, temperament,[39] and that should alone deserve being considered as soul. No simple bodies could exist, much less composite bodies, unless there was a soul in the universe; for it is (seminal) reason which, in, adding itself to matter, produces body.[40] But surely a (seminal) reason could proceed from nowhere except a soul. NO ATOMIC AGGREGATION COULD PRODUCE A SELF-HARMONIZING UNITY. 3. (b.) (No aggregation of atoms could form a whole that would be one and sympathetic with itself.) Others, on the contrary, insist that the soul is constituted by the union of atoms or indivisibles (as thought Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus.[41]) To refute this error, we have to examine the nature of sympathy (or community of affection, a Stoic characteristic of a living being,[42]) and juxtaposition.[43] On the one hand an aggregation of corporeal molecules which are incapable of being united, and which do not feel cannot form a single sympathetic whole such as is the soul, which is sympathetic with herself. On the other hand, how could a body or extension be constituted by (a juxtaposition of) atoms? SOUL IS A SIMPLE SUBSTANCE, WHILE EVERY BODY IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM. (c.) (Every body is a composite of matter and form, while the soul is a simple substance.) Inasmuch as matter possesses no quality,[44] the matter of no simple body will be said to possess life in itself. That which imparts life to it must then be its form. If form is a "being," the soul cannot simultaneously be matter and form; it will be only matter or form. Consequently, the soul will not be the body, since the body is not constituted by matter exclusively, as could be proved analytically, if necessary. IF SOUL IS ONLY AN AFFECTION OF MATTER, WHENCE THAT AFFECTION? (d.) (The soul is not a simple manner of being of matter, because matter could not give itself a form.) Some Stoics might deny that form was a "being," asserting the soul to be a mere affection (or, manner of being) of matter.[45] From whence then did matter acquire this affection and animating life? Surely matter itself could not endow itself with a form and a soul. That which endows matter or any body with life must then be some principle alien and superior to corporeal nature. NO BODY COULD SUBSIST WITHOUT THE POWER OF THE UNIVERSAL SOUL.