Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods — John Shaqi
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 1: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
(11). (If, as Stoics claim, man first was a certain nature called
habit,[70] then a soul, and last an intelligence, the perfect would
have arisen from the imperfect, which is impossible). To say that
the first nature of the soul is to be a spirit, and that this spirit
became soul only after having been exposed to cold, and as it were
became soaked by its contact, because the cold subtilized it;[71] this
is an absurd hypothesis. Many animals are born in warm places, and do
not have their soul exposed to action of cold. Under this hypothesis,
the primary nature of the soul would have been made dependent on the
concourse of exterior circumstances. The Stoics, therefore, posit as
principle that which is less perfect (the soul), and trace it to a
still less perfect earlier thing called habit (or form of inorganic
things).[72] Intelligence, therefore, is posited in the last rank
since it is alleged to be born of the soul, while, on the contrary,
the first rank should be assigned to intelligence, the second to the
soul, the third to nature, and, following natural order, consider
that which is less perfect as the posterior element. In this system
the divinity, by the mere fact of his possessing intelligence, is
posterior and begotten, possessing only an incidental intelligence.
The result would, therefore, be that there was neither soul, nor
intelligence, nor divinity; for never can that which is potential pass
to the condition of actualization, without the prior existence of some
actualized principle. If what is potential were to transform itself
into actualization--which is absurd--its passage into actualization
will have to involve at the very least a contemplation of something
which is not merely potential, but actualized. Nevertheless, on the
hypothesis that what is potential can permanently remain identical, it
will of itself pass into actualization, and will be superior to the
being which is potential only because it will be the object of the
aspiration of such a being. We must, therefore, assign the first rank
to the being that has a perfect and incorporeal nature, which is always
in actualization. Thus intelligence and soul are prior to nature; the
soul, therefore, is not a spirit, and consequently no body. Other
reasons for the incorporeality of the soul have been advanced; but the
above suffices (as thought Aristotle).[73]
II. THE SOUL IS NEITHER THE HARMONY NOR ENTELECHY OF THE BODY--THE SOUL
IS THE HARMONY OF THE BODY; AGAINST THE PYTHAGOREANS.
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