Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
8. When light emanates from a body it is easy to tell when it shines,
because the location of that body is known. But if a being be
immaterial, if it have no need of a body, if it be anterior to all
bodies, and be founded on itself, or rather if it have no need, as
has a body, or resting on any foundation--then, a being endowed with
such a nature has no origin from which it is derived, resides in no
place, and depends on no body. How could you then say that one of its
parts is here, and another is there? For thus it would have an origin
from which it had issued, and it would depend from something. We must,
therefore, say that if something participate in this being by the
power of the universe, it participates in this being entirely, without
thereby being changed or divided; for it is a being united to a body
that suffers (although often that happens to it only accidentally),
and in this respect it may be said that it is passive and divisible,
since it is some part of the body, either its passion, or form. As
to the (being) which is united to any body, and to which the body
aspires to be united, it must in no manner share the passions of the
body, as such; for the essential passion of the body, as such, is
to divide itself. If, therefore, the body be by nature inclined to
divide itself, then is the incorporeal, by nature, indivisible. How,
in fact, could one divide that which has no extension? If, therefore,
the extended (being) participate in the (being) which has no extension,
it participates in this (being) without dividing it; otherwise, this
(being) would have extension. Consequently, when you say that the
unity (of the universal essence) is in the manifold, you do not say
that unity has become manifoldness, but you refer to this unity the
manner of existence of the multitude, seeing it in this whole multitude
simultaneously. As to this Unity, it will have to be understood that
it belongs to no individual, nor to the whole multitude, but that it
belongs to itself alone, that it is itself, and that, being itself,
it does not fail to support itself. Nor does it possess a magnitude
such as of our universe, nor, let alone, such as that of one of the
parts of the universe; for it has absolutely no magnitude. How could
it have any magnitude? It is the body that should have such magnitude.
As to the (being) whose nature is entirely different from that of the
body, no magnitude should be ascribed to it. If it have no magnitude,
it is nowhere; it is neither here nor there; for if so, it would be in
several places. If then the local division suits only the (being) of
which one part is here, and the other there, how could the (being) that
is neither here nor there be divided? Consequently, the incorporeal
(being) must remain indivisible in itself, although the multitude of
things aspire to unite itself to it, and succeeds therein. If they
aspire to possess it, they aspire to possess it entire, so that if
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