Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
uniquely the Good, possesses nothing within Himself, is mingled with
nothing, is superior to all things, and is the cause of all things. The
beautiful and that which is "being" could not derive from evil, or from
indifferent principles; for the cause being more perfect, is always
better than its effects.
SECOND ENNEAD, BOOK NINE.
Against the Gnostics; or, That the Creator and the World are Not
Evil.[275]
THE SUPREME PRINCIPLES MUST BE SIMPLE AND NOT COMPOUND.
1. We have already seen[276] that the nature of the Good is simple and
primary, for nothing that is not primary could be simple. We have also
demonstrated that the nature of the Good contains nothing in itself,
but is something unitary, the very nature of the One; for in itself
the One is not some thing to which unity could be added, any more than
the Good in itself is some thing to which goodness could be added.
Consequently, as both the One and the Good are simplicity itself, when
we speak of the One and the Good, these two words express but one and
the same nature; they affirm nothing, and only represent it to us so
far as possible. This nature is called the First, because it is very
simple, and not composite; it is the absolute as self-sufficient,
because it is not composite; otherwise it would depend on the things
of which it was composed. Neither is it predicable of anything (as an
attribute in a subject) for all that is in another thing comes from
something else. If then this nature be not in anything else, nor is
derived from anything else, if it contain nothing composite, it must
not have anything above it.
THE ONLY SUPREME PRINCIPLES MUST THEN BE UNITY, INTELLIGENCE AND SOUL.
Consequently there are no principles other (than the three divine
hypostatic substances); and the first rank will have to be assigned
to Unity, the second to Intelligence, as the first thinking
principle,[277] and the third to the Soul. Such indeed is the natural
order, which admits of no further principles, in the intelligible
world. If less be claimed, it is because of a confusion between the
Soul and Intelligence, or Intelligence with the First; but we have
often pointed out their mutual differences.[278] The only thing left
is to examine if there might not be more than these three hypostatic
substances; and in this case, what their nature might be.
THE ARISTOTELIAN DISTINCTION OF POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO DIVINITY.
The Principle of all things, such as we have described it, is the
most simple and elevated possible. The (Gnostics) are wrong in
distinguishing within that (supreme Principle[279]) potentiality
from actualization[280]; for it would be ridiculous to seek to apply
to principles that are immaterial and are actualizations, that
(Aristotelian) distinction, and thus to increase the number (of the
divine hypostatic substances.[281])
THE DISTINCTION OF REST AND MOVEMENT ALSO INAPPLICABLE.
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