Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
Neither could we, below the Supreme, distinguish two intelligences, one
at rest, and the other in motion.[282] We should have to define the
resting of the First, and the movement or utterance[283] of the second.
The inaction of the one and the action of the other would be equally
mysterious. By its being (or, nature), Intelligence is eternally and
identically a permanent actualization. To rise to Intelligence and to
move around it is the proper function of the soul.
AN INTERMEDIARY LOGOS (OR AEON JESUS), ALSO UNACCOUNTABLE.
Reason (logos) which descends from Intelligence into the Soul, and
intellectualizes her, does not constitute a nature distinct from the
Soul and Intelligence, and intermediary between them.
CONSCIOUSNESS IS UNITARY THOUGH CONTAINING THINKER, OBJECT AND THOUGHT.
Nor should we admit the existence of several intelligences, merely
because we distinguish a thinker from a consciousness of the thinker.
Though there be a difference between thinking, and thinking that
one thinks, these two nevertheless constitute a single intuitive
consciousness of its actualizations. It would be ridiculous to deny
such a consciousness to veritable Intelligence. It is therefore
the same Intelligence that thinks, and that thinks that it thinks.
Otherwise there would be two principles, of which the one would have
thought, and the other consciousness of thought. The second would
doubtless differ from the first, but would not be the real thinking
principle. A mere logical distinction between thought and consciousness
of thought would not establish the (actual) differences between two
(hypostatic substances). Further, we shall have to consider whether
it be possible to conceive of an Intelligence which would exclusively
think, without any accompanying consciousness of its thought.[284]
If we ourselves who are entirely devoted to practical activity and
discursive reason were in such a condition,[285] we would, even if
otherwise considered sensible, be insane. But as true Intelligence
thinks itself in its thoughts, and as the intelligible, far from
being outside of Intelligence, is Intelligence itself, Intelligence,
by thinking, possesses itself, and necessarily sees itself.[286] When
Intelligence sees itself, it does not see itself as unintelligent,
but as intelligent. Therefore in the first actualization of thought,
Intelligence has the thought and consciousness of thought, two things
that form but a single one; not even logically is this a duality. If
Intelligence always thinks what it is, is there any reason to separate,
even by a simple logical distinction, thought from the consciousness
of thought? The absurdity of the doctrine we are controverting will be
still more evident if we suppose that a third intelligence is conscious
that the second intelligence is conscious of the thought of the first;
we might thus go on to infinity.[287]
A DIFFERENTIATED REASON WOULD DEPRIVE THE SOUL OF CONSCIOUSNESS.
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