Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
Therefore, approaching it,
the body of the universe finds the universal "Being"; having no need
of going any farther, it turns around the same thing because the thing
around which it turns is the veritably universal (Being), so that in
all its parts it enjoys the presence of this whole entire Being. If
the universal (Being) were in a place, our world should (instead of
having a circular motion), rush towards it in a straight line, touching
different parts of this Being by different parts of its own, and find
itself on one side distant from it, and on the other side near it. But
as the universal (Being) is neither near one place, nor distant from,
another, it is necessarily entirely present as soon as it is at all
present. Consequently, it is entirely present to each of these things
from which it is neither near nor far; it is present to the things that
are able to receive it.
THE UNIVERSAL BEING IS INDIVISIBLE.
3. Is the universal (Being) by itself present everywhere? Or does it
remain within itself, while from its innermost its powers descend on
all things, and is it in this sense that it is regarded as everywhere
present? Yes, doubtless. That is why it is said that souls are the rays
of this universal (Being), that it is built on itself, and that from
it, souls descend into various animals. The things which participate
in its unity, incapable as they are of possessing a complete nature
conformed to its nature, enjoy the presence of the universal (Being) in
this sense that they enjoy the presence of some of its powers. They are
not, however, entirely separated from it, because it is not separated
from the power which it communicates to each of them. If they do not
have more, it is only because they are not capable of receiving more
from the presence of the entire whole (Being). Evidently it is always
entirely present there where its powers are present. It however remains
separated, for if it became the form of any one particular being, it
would cease to be universal, to subsist everywhere in itself, and
it would be the accident of some other "being." Therefore, since it
belongs to none of these things, even of those that aspire to unite
themselves with it, it makes them enjoy its presence when they desire
it, and in the measure in which they are capable thereof; but it
does not belong to any of them in particular. It is not surprising,
therefore, that it should be present in all things, since it is not
present in any in a manner such as to belong to it alone. It is also
reasonable to assert that, if the soul share the passions of the
bodies, it is only by accident, that she dwells in herself, and belongs
neither to matter nor to body, that the whole of her illuminates
the whole world-body. It is not a contradiction to say that the
(Being) which is not present in any place is present to all things
each of which is in a place. What, indeed, would be surprising and
impossible would be that the universal (Being) could, while occupying
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