Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
How might one apply actual existence to intelligible things? Each
of them exists actually because it has received form, as the statue
(the compound) exists actually, or rather, because it is a form, and
because its essence is a perfect form. The intelligence does not pass
from the potentiality of thinking to the actuality of thinking.[23]
Otherwise, it would imply an anterior intelligence which would not
pass from potentiality to actuality, which would possess everything by
itself; for what exists potentially implies another principle whose
intervention brings it to actuality, so as to be something existing
actually. A being is an actuality when it always is what it is, by
itself. Therefore, all first principles are actualities; for they
possess all they should possess by themselves, eternally. Such is the
state of the soul which is not in matter, but in the intelligible
world. The soul which is in matter is another actuality; she is, for
instance, the vegetative soul; for she is in actuality what she is.
We shall, therefore, have to admit that (in the intelligible world)
everything exists actually, and that thus everything is actuality,
because it has rightly been said[24] that intelligible nature is always
awake, that it is a life, an excellent life, and that there on high
all actualities are perfect. Therefore, in the intelligible world,
everything exists actually, and everything is actuality and life. The
place of intelligible things is the place of life, the principle and
source of the veritable soul, and of intelligence.
MATTER IS NON-BEING, AND CAN NOT BE ANYTHING ACTUAL.
4. All the other objects (the sense-objects), which are something
potentially, are also actually something else, which, in regard to
the First, may be said to be potential existence. As to matter, which
exists potentially in all beings, how could it actually be some
of these beings? Evidently, it would then no longer be all beings
potentially. If matter be none of the beings, it necessarily is not a
being. If it be none of the beings, how could it actually be something?
Consequently, matter is none of the beings that in it "become." But
might it not be something else, since all things are not in matter? If
matter be none of the beings which are therein, and if these really
are beings, matter must be non-being. Since, by imagination, it is
conceived as something formless, it could not be a form; as being, it
could not be counted among the forms; which is an additional reason
why it should be considered as non-being. As matter, therefore, is no
"being" neither in respect of beings, nor of forms, matter is non-being
in the highest degree. Since matter does not possess the nature of
veritable beings, and since it cannot even claim a place among the
objects falsely called beings (for not even like these is matter an
image of reason), in what kind of being could matter be included? If it
cannot be included in any, it can evidently not be something actually.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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