Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods — John Shaqi
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
If, (on the Stoic hypothesis) the soul were extended, and corporeal, it
would be difficult, or rather impossible for her to remain impassible
and unalterable when the above-mentioned occurrences take place within
her. If, on the contrary, she be a "being" that is unextended, and
incorruptible, we must take care not to attribute to her affections
that might imply that she is perishable. If, on the contrary, her
"being" be a number[28] or a reason,[29] as we usually say, how could
an affection occur within a number or a reason? We must therefore
attribute to the soul only irrational reasons, passions without
passivity; that is, we must consider these terms as no more than
metaphors drawn from the nature of bodies, taking them in an opposite
sense, seeing in them no more than mere analogies, so that we may say
that the soul experiences them without experiencing them, and that
she is passive without really being such (as are the bodies). Let us
examine how all this occurs.
VIRTUE AS A HARMONY; VICE AS A DISHARMONY.
2. What occurs in the soul when she contains a vice? We ask this
because it is usual to say, "to snatch a vice from the soul;" "to
introduce virtue into her," "to adorn her," "to replace ugliness by
beauty in her." Let us also premiss, following the opinions of the
ancients,[30] that virtue is a harmony, and wickedness the opposite.
That is the best means to solve the problem at issue. Indeed, when the
parts of the soul (the rational part, the irascible part, and the part
of appetite), harmonize with each other, we shall have virtue;[31] and,
in the contrary case, vice. Still, in both cases, nothing foreign to
the soul enters into her; each of her parts remain what they are, while
contributing to harmony. On the other hand, when there is dissonance,
they could not play the same parts as the personnel of a choric ballet,
who dance and sing in harmony, though not all of them fill the same
functions; though one sings while the remainder are silent; and though
each sings his own part; for it does not suffice that they all sing
in tune, they must each properly sing his own part. In the soul we
therefore have harmony when each part fulfils its functions. Still each
must have its own virtue before the existence of a harmony; or its
vice, before there is disharmony. What then is the thing whose presence
makes each part of the soul good or evil? Evidently the presence of
virtue or vice. The mere statement that, for the rational part (of
the soul) vice consists in ignorance,[32] is no more than a simple
negation, and predicates nothing positive about reason.
THIS DEFINITION SUFFICES TO EXPLAIN THE FACTS OF EVIL IN THE SOUL.
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