Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods — John Shaqi
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 2: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
In short, we insist that action, life and desire are not alterations,
that memories are not forms impressed on the soul, and that
actualizations of the imagination are not impressions similar to those
of a seal on wax.[41] Consequently in all that we call "passions" or
"movements," the soul undergoes no change in her substance (substrate)
or "being" (nature); virtue and vice in the soul are not similar
to what heat, cold, whiteness or blackness are in bodies; and the
soul's relation to vice and virtue is entirely different, as has been
explained.
PASSIONAL CHANGES OCCUR IN THE BODY, NOT EVEN TO THE PASSIONAL PART OF
THE SOUL.
4. Let us now pass to that part of the soul that is called the
"passional" (or, affective). We have already mentioned it,[42] when
treating of all the "passions" (that is, affections), which were
related to the irascible-part and appetitive part of the soul; but we
are going to return to a study of this part, and explain its name, the
"passional" (or, affective) part. It is so called because it seems
to be the part affected by the "passions;"[43] that is, experiences
accompanied by pleasure or pain.[44] Amidst these affections, some are
born of opinion; thus, we feel fear or joy, according as we expect
to die, or as we hope to attain some good; then the "opinion" is in
the soul, and the "affection" in the body. On the contrary, other
passions, occurring in an unforeseen way, give rise to opinion in that
part of the soul to which this function belongs, but do not cause any
alteration within her, as we have already explained. Nevertheless, if,
on examining unexpected fear, we follow it up higher, we discover that
it still contains opinion as its origin, implying some apprehension in
that part of the soul that experiences fear, as a result of which occur
the trouble and stupor which accompany the expectation of evil. Now it
is to the soul that belongs imagination, both the primary imagination
that we call opinion, and the (secondary) imagination that proceeds
from the former; for the latter is no longer genuine opinion, but
an inferior power, an obscure opinion, a confused imagination which
resembles the action characteristic of nature, and by which this power
produces each thing, as we say, unimaginatively.[45] Its resulting
sense-agitation occurs within the body. To it relate trembling,
palpitation, paleness, and inability to speak. Such modifications,
indeed, could not be referred to any part of the soul; otherwise, such
part of the soul would be physical. Further, if such part of the soul
underwent such affections these modifications would not reach the body;
for that affected part of the soul would no longer be able to exercise
its functions, being dominated by passion, and thus incapacitated.
THE SOUL'S AFFECTIVE PART MAY BE THE CAUSE OF AFFECTIONS; BUT IS
INCORPOREAL.
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