Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four PeriodsPlotinus
Philosophy
Plotinos: Complete Works, v. 4: In Chronological Order, Grouped in Four Periods
Plotinus
Plotinus
Gnostic planning of the world by God, refuted, v. 8.7, 12 (31-561,
572).
God cannot be responsible for our ills, iv. 4.39 (28-503).
God not remembered by world-soul continuing to be seen, iv. 4.7
(28-449).
God's planning of the world (gnosticism) refuted, v. 8.7 (31-561).
God relation with individual and soul, i. 1.8 (53-1200).
Golden face of Justice, i. 6.4 (1-45).
Good absolute, permanence chief characteristic, i. 7.1 (54-1209).
Good, all things depend on by unity, essence and quality, i. 7.1
(54-1209).
Good and beauty identical, i. 6.6 (1-50).
Good and one, vi. 9 (9-147).
Good as consisting in intelligence, i. 4.3 (46-1024).
Good, as everything tends toward it, it tends toward the one, vi.
2.12 (43-914).
Good, as supra-cogitative, is also supra-active, v. 6.6 (24-340).
Good as supreme, neither needs nor possesses intellection, iii. 8.10
(30-548).
Good cannot be a desire of the soul, vi. 7.19 (38-734).
Good cannot be pleasure, which is changeable and restless, vi. 7.27
(38-754).
Good consists in illumination by the Supreme, vi. 7.22 (38-737).
Good contains no thought, vi. 7.40 (38-766).
Good does not figure among true categories, vi. 2.17 (43-922).
Good, even if it thought, there would be need of something superior,
vi. 7.40 (38-767).
Good, form of, borne by life, intelligence and idea, vi. 7.18
(38-731).
Good for the individual is illumination, vi. 7.24 (38-740).
Good has no need of beauty, while beauty has of the good, v. 5.12
(32-594).
Good, if it is a genus, must be one of the posterior ones, vi. 2.17
(43-921).
Good, implied by scorn of life, vi. 7.29 (38-748).
Good implies evil because matter is necessary to the world, i. 8.7
(51-1152).
Good, in what does it consist, iv. 1.
Good, inseparable from evil, iii. 3.7 (48-1088).
Good, intelligence and soul, are like light, sun and moon, v. 6.4
(24-337).
Good is a nature that possesses no kind of form in itself, vi. 7.28
(38-746).
Good is a simple perception of itself; a touch, vi. 7.39 (38-764).
Good is creator and preserver, vi. 7.23 (38-740).
Good is free, but not merely by chance, vi. 8.7 (39-783).
Good is not for itself, but for the natures below it, vi. 7.41
(38-769).
Good is intelligence and primary life, vi. 7.21 (38-737).
Good, is it a common label or a common quality? vi. 7.18 (38-733).
Good is not only cause, but intuition of being, vi. 7.16 (38-728).
Good is such, just because it has no attributes worthy of it, v. 5.13
(32-595).
Good is superior to all its possessions, as result of its being
supreme, v. 5.12 (32-595).
Good is superior to beautiful and is cognized by mind, v. 5.12
(32-594).
Good is super-thinking, v. 6.5 (24-338).
Good is super-thought, iii. 9.9 (13-225).
Good is supreme, because of its supremacy, vi. 7.23 (38-739).
Good is desirable in itself, vi. 8.8 (39-783).
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