Plutarch on the Delay of the Divine JusticePlutarch
Philosophy
Plutarch on the Delay of the Divine Justice
Plutarch
Punishment -- Early works to 1800
so reason performs right and moderate deeds, putting anger and
resentment to flight. Hence it is that men are made meek by the
examples of other men; as when they hear how Plato, having lifted
his staff over his servant’s head, stood still for a long time,
punishing his own anger, as he said; and how Archytas, learning of
some misconduct and disorder of his laborers in the field, conscious
that he was becoming resentful and bitter in his feeling toward them,
did nothing except to say, as he left them, “It is fortunate for you
that I am angry.” But if the reported sayings and doings of men can
tone down the harshness and severity of anger, how much more fitting
is it that we—seeing that God, to whom there is no need of delay nor
possibility of repentance, yet puts off punishment into the future,
and awaits its fitting time—should ourselves be circumspect in these
matters, and should regard as a Divine part of virtue the clemency and
long-suffering which God manifests, reforming few indeed by punishment,
but by the slowness of punishment benefiting and admonishing many![12:2]
6. Let us next consider, in the second place, that punishments
inflicted by men have no purpose but retaliation, terminating in the
suffering of the wrong-doer, and going no farther. They thus follow
hard upon the offences, as a dog barking at the offender’s heels,
and pursue evil deeds close in their rear. But God probably sees
through the dispositions of the diseased souls to which he draws nigh
in judgment, knows whether they show an inclination to repentance,
and grants time for reformation to those whose guilt has not been
excessive or irreclaimable. For, aware what endowment of virtue souls
bring from him when they come into the world, and how strong and
imperishable in them is this native nobleness, which, though—corrupted
by bad association and nurture—it may blossom into evil contrary to
nature, yet when cured restores some men entirely to proper habits of
life, he therefore does not punish all alike; but the incurable he
speedily takes out of being, and cuts them off, inasmuch as it is not
only harmful to others, but, most of all, injurious to the sinner’s
own self, to be always conversant with wickedness. On the other hand,
to those whose sins probably proceeded rather from ignorance of the
good than from preference for what is vile, he gives time for a change
of character; but if they continue as they are, he executes justice
on them too, and there is no danger of their escaping. Now see what
changes have taken place in the habits and lives of men. Therefore
the changeable part of the life or character is designated by a word
denoting _turn_,[14:1] and also by a word denoting _habit_,[14:2]
because habit constitutes a large part of the character, and, when
adopted, has commanding influence. I am inclined to think, indeed,
that the ancients ascribed to Cecrops[14:3] a double nature, not, as
some say, because from a good king he became a fierce and dragon-like
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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