Plutarch on the Delay of the Divine JusticePlutarch
Philosophy
Plutarch on the Delay of the Divine Justice
Plutarch
Punishment -- Early works to 1800
19. Bion[52:1] says that God in punishing the children of the wicked
is more ridiculous than a physician who should administer medicine to
a grandson or a son for his grandfather’s or his father’s illness. But
the two things are in some respects unlike, though in others alike and
similar. It is true, indeed, that one person’s being medically treated
does not remove another’s illness, nor is one who is suffering from
ophthalmia or from fever relieved by seeing another person anointed or
plastered; but the punishments of the wicked are inflicted in the sight
of all, because it is the office of justice reasonably administered
to restrain some by means of the penalties endured by others. But the
point in which Bion’s comparison really applies to the subject under
discussion escaped his discernment. When a man seized with a stubborn,
but not necessarily incurable illness, yields up his body to the
disease by intemperance and effeminacy, and dies in consequence, if his
son, though not seeming to be ill, yet barely has a tendency to the
same disease, his physician, or kinsman, or apothecary, or judicious
master, putting him upon a rigid diet, taking from him stimulants,
delicacies, strong drinks, and opportunities for sensual indulgence,
employing medicaments continually, and disciplining his body by
gymnastic exercises, excludes and expels the disease, not suffering the
minute seed of a grievous bodily affection to grow into an appreciable
magnitude. Do we not thus give our advice, thinking it fitting for the
children of diseased fathers and mothers to take care of themselves, to
be on their guard, and not to lose thought of their inherited liability
to disease, but promptly taking the inborn malady in hand, to expel it
at the beginning, while it is easily removed and has no fixed seat?
This is perfectly true, they say.
You grant then, I continue, that we do, not what is absurd, but what
is necessary,—not what is ridiculous, but what is beneficial,—when we
prescribe gymnastic exercises, diet, and medicine for the children
of epileptics, or of hypochondriacs, or of sufferers from the gout,
not because they are ill, but to prevent them from being ill. For a
body born of a diseased body is deserving, not indeed of punishment,
but of medical treatment and of vigilance, which if any one sees fit
to call the punishment of timidity and feebleness, his opinion is of
no account. If then it is worth our while to cherish and to preserve
the body born of a diseased body, ought we to permit the congenital
likeness of wickedness to spring up and come to growth in a young
character, and to wait till, having its issue in vicious passions, it
becomes openly manifest, and, as Pindar says, displays the malignant
fruit of the inmost soul?
20. In this matter God in his wisdom does not even transcend the
sentiment expressed by Hesiod,[54:1]
“From suppers of the gods the marriage-bed
Approach, and not from rites funereal,”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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