For it is an unhappy thing and not to be wished, for a man to obtain and be master of what he desires if it be inexpedient. Again this saying, Thou, Agamemnon, must thyself prepare Of joy and grief by turns to take thy share: Thy father, Atreus, sure, ne’er thee begat, To be an unchanged favorite of Fate:[83] we may thus invert: Thy father, Atreus, never thee begat, To be an unchanged favorite of Fate: Therefore, if moderate thy fortunes are, Thou shouldst rejoice always, and grief forbear. Again it is said, Alas! this ill comes from the powers divine, That oft we see what’s good, yet it decline.[84] Yea, rather, say we, it is a brutish and irrational and wretched fault of ours, that when we understand better things, we are carried away to the pursuit of those which are worse, through our intemperance and effeminacy. Again, one says, ’Tis not the teacher’s speech but practice moves.[85] Yea, rather, say we, both the speech and practice,—or the practice by the means of speech,—as the horse is managed with the bridle, and the ship with the helm. For virtue hath no instrument so suitable and agreeable to human nature to work on men withal, as that of rational discourse. Again, we meet with this character of some person: A. Is he more prone to male or female loves? B. He’s flexible both ways, where beauty moves. But it had been better said thus: He’s flexible to both, where virtue moves. For it is no commendation of a man’s dexterity to be tossed up and down as pleasure and beauty move him, but an argument rather of a weak and unstable disposition. Once more, this speech, Religion damps the courage of our minds, And ev’n wise men to cowardice inclines, is by no means to be allowed; but rather the contrary, Religion truly fortifies men’s minds, And a wise man to valiant acts inclines, and gives not occasion of fear to any but weak and foolish persons and such as are ungrateful to the Deity, who are apt to look on that divine power and principle which is the cause of all good with suspicion and jealousy, as being hurtful unto them. And so much for that which I call correction of poets’ sayings. 13. There is yet another way of improving poems, taught us well by Chrysippus; which is, by accommodation of any saying, to transfer that which is useful and serviceable in it to divers things of the same kind. For whereas Hesiod saith, If but a cow be lost, the common fame Upon the next ill neighbor lays the blame;[86] the same may be applied to a man’s dog or ass or any other beast of his which is liable to the like mischance. Again, Euripides saith, How can that man be called a slave, who slights Ev’n death itself, which servile spirits frights?