Popular Law-making: A study of the origin, history, and present tendencies of law-making by statuteStimson, Frederic Jesup
History
Popular Law-making: A study of the origin, history, and present tendencies of law-making by statute
Stimson, Frederic Jesup
Legislation -- United States
Going on with the statutes, the next thing we will note is a matter
that concerns the personal relations. It shows again how eagerly our
English common law overruled the church law, the canon law. Although
the church under the pope always pretended that it alone had authority
to regulate relations between the sexes, marriage and divorce, we
found Henry I interfering with the priests themselves, and we now find
as early as 1235, a secular statute which extends the interference of
the secular law over the relations between parent and child; that is,
as to when a child should be legitimate and when not. We shall have a
great deal to say later about marriage and divorce laws, particularly
divorce laws as they exist in this country and as they apparently are
going to be. As early as 1235 the secular courts interfered with the
marriage relation; and the importance of that is here: there is one
great school to-day, including largely clergymen and the divorce
reformers, so-called, who hold substantially that marriage is a
sacrament, or at least a status; that the secular law has nothing to
do with it and should not be allowed to grant a divorce except for
canonical causes, _i.e._, causes recognized by the church; that it
is not like any other contract, which can be set aside with mutual
consent; when a marriage takes place, they say, it is a sacrament,
or, at least, a status ensues which cannot in future be altered.
Consequently, it is not like a contract; for all contracts can be
abrogated by mutual consent. On the other hand, the most radical
people go to the other extreme, and say that marriage _is_ like any
other contract; it is purely a civil contract, not a sacrament, not
a status; just like any other, and some of them go to what is the
logical conclusion of that position and say that therefore marriage,
like any other contract, ought to be ended at any time by the consent
of both parties. The extreme radical view leads to the conclusion that
a man and woman ought to be divorced any time by merely saying that
they want to be; and some States have almost got to this position in
their statutes. This may seem a very far cry from this early statute,
which does not directly concern marriage but the status of children;
nevertheless it has this bearing--it is an interference by Parliament,
by the secular, legislative branch of government, with a relation
which the church believed to belong only to the church. It so happens
that in this instance the secular law instead of being liberal and
kindly was extremely cruel and the reverse of liberal. Under the
church law, when a man married a woman by whom he already had
children, all those children were thereby made legitimate, and that
certainly seems the kindly and the Christian law. But the secular
barons who constituted the Parliament, in their jealousy for the
common law, took the harsher view, that any children born of parents
who are not married at the time they are born shall be illegitimate,
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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