Popular lectures on scientific subjects : $b Second series, with an autobiography of the authorHelmholtz, Hermann von
Science
Popular lectures on scientific subjects : $b Second series, with an autobiography of the author
Helmholtz, Hermann von
Science; Universities and colleges -- Germany
At the same time it must be noted that as a small elastic flat disk,
say of india-rubber, can only be fitted to a slightly curved spherical
surface with relative contraction of its border and distension of
its centre, so our bodies, developed in Euclid’s flat space, could
not pass into curved space without undergoing similar distensions
and contractions of their parts, their coherence being of course
maintained only in as far as their elasticity permitted their bending
without breaking. The kind of distension must be the same as in passing
from a small body imagined at the centre of Beltrami’s sphere to its
pseudospherical or spherical representation. For such passage to
appear possible, it will always have to be assumed that the body is
sufficiently elastic and small in comparison with the real or imaginary
radius of curvature of the curved space into which it is to pass.
These remarks will suffice to show the way in which we can infer
from the known laws of our sensible perceptions the series of
sensible impressions which a spherical or pseudospherical world
would give us, if it existed. In doing so, we nowhere meet with
inconsistency or impossibility any more than in the calculation of
its metrical proportions. We can represent to ourselves the look of
a pseudospherical world in all directions just as we can develop the
conception of it. Therefore it cannot be allowed that the axioms of our
geometry depend on the native form of our perceptive faculty, or are
in any way connected with it.
It is different with the three dimensions of space. As all our means of
sense-perception extend only to space of three dimensions, and a fourth
is not merely a modification of what we have, but something perfectly
new, we find ourselves by reason of our bodily organisation quite
unable to represent a fourth dimension.
In conclusion, I would again urge that the axioms of geometry are not
propositions pertaining only to the pure doctrine of space. As I said
before, they are concerned with quantity. We can speak of quantities
only when we know of some way by which we can compare, divide, and
measure them. All space-measurements, and therefore in general all
ideas of quantities applied to space, assume the possibility of figures
moving without change of form or size. It is true we are accustomed
in geometry to call such figures purely geometrical solids, surfaces,
angles, and lines, because we abstract from all the other distinctions,
physical and chemical, of natural bodies; but yet one physical quality,
rigidity, is retained. Now we have no other mark of rigidity of bodies
or figures but congruence, whenever they are applied to one another
at any time or place, and after any revolution. We cannot, however,
decide by pure geometry, and without mechanical considerations, whether
the coinciding bodies may not both have varied in the same sense.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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