The figures contained in Bryce’s _American Commonwealth_, Vol. II, p. 119, as to ruling rates for political nominations under this much prized system of political brigandage are these: Alderman, $1,500; Legislature, $500 to $1,500; Judgeship, $5,000 to $15,000; Congress, $4,000. The New York County Clerk at one time collected about $80,000 a year in fees, of which the political machine required him to hand over two-thirds. Writing in 1899 Dorman B. Eaton states the regular price of a high judicial nomination is $10,000 to $15,000. (_Government of Municipalities_, p. 107.) Another more recent writer gives the figures for political assessments for the large city as follows: For County Clerk and Register, $15,000; Alderman, $13,000; Sheriff, $25,000; Comptroller, $10,000; Mayor, $20,000; Police Justice, $6,500. Not only the offices but the party itself is sometimes for sale in this or that ward or city. The bargains between the Republican and Democratic machines in New York City and elsewhere have been so frequently denounced and exposed by the politicians themselves as to need no proof. It is a matter of common knowledge that the bosses are able at times in shrewd transactions with opposing bosses to barter certain public offices, batches of offices and measures for other similar merchandise, and to carry out the bargain; thus causing the votes cast at an election to have directly the opposite effect from that supposed to be desired by the voters, though perhaps many of the floaters or regulars among them would be perfectly satisfied with the “deal.” It must be borne in mind that the ultimate object of all these “deals” and this political traffic is money; the party managers are not looking for public honors but for cash; they are actually engaged in building up fortunes for themselves and their backers, who are public contractors and the like. “Hence it is the opportunity and desire for public pelf, directly or indirectly, and for gratifying personal ambition without reference to public service, that are the most potent influences in the formation and cohesiveness of the ‘machine.’” (_Democracy_, p. 269.) An instance of the friendly relations between rival machines is mentioned by Bryce in writing of the effort to get the Democratic machine in Philadelphia in 1870 to help oust the Republican Gas Ring: “But the Democratic wire-pullers, being mostly men of the same stamp as the Gas Ring, did not seek a temporary gain at the expense of a permanent disparagement of their own class. Political principles are the last thing which the professional city politician cares for. It was better worth the while of the Democratic chiefs to wait for their turn, and in the meantime to get something out of occasional bargains with their (nominal) Republican opponents, than to strengthen the cause of good government at the expense of the professional class.” (_American Commonwealth_, Vol. II, p. 411.)