Certainly Congress, in requiring the Atomic Energy Commission to report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy any instances in which it imparted atomic secrets to other nations, contemplated committee control of such action. Arrangements with other nations were not to be consummated until the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy had been fully informed for a period of thirty days in which the Congress was in session.[581] If the Committee disapproved the arrangement and found the Commission unresponsive to its influence, the former would have time in which to report this fact to Congress. When it authorized the establishment of a long-range proving ground for guided missiles in 1949, Congress stipulated that prior to the acquiring of lands under this law the Secretary of the Air Force had to come “into agreement with the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives with respect to the acquisition of such lands.”[582] This clearly established a joint committee-agency decision-making arrangement. A 1951 statute required the Secretaries of the Army, Air Force, and Navy, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, to come into agreement with the two Armed Services Committees whenever real estate actions by or for the use of the military departments or the Federal Civil Defense Administration were involved.[583] The Emergency Powers Interim Continuation Act of July 1952, continued this provision in force.[584] In conclusion we mention a device for securing to congressional committees a form of suspensive power over administrative action. This is the familiar provision for suspension of deportation orders where either the Immigration and Naturalization Committee of the House or of the Senate Committee on Immigration has favorably acted on a bill for the relief of the alien in question. The Act cited here was restricted in effect to the Seventy-fifth Congress, and stays of deportation under it were to be terminated at least by the date of adjournment of the first regular session of the Seventy-sixth Congress.[585] ACCOUNTING TO CONGRESS The preponderance of relevant data collected under this particular head consists of routine requirements, inserted in delegatory statutes, that administrators periodically report to the Congress on the discharge of their functions. It need hardly be stressed that by this method of acquiring information Congress not only equips itself with data vitally prerequisite to its exercise of the function of oversight, but that its demand for such information in itself represents a form of control. The necessity of periodic reporting interposes an effective psychological hurdle between the administrator and intentional malfeasance. Certain reporting provisions clearly reflect a desire to maintain a continuous check upon the administration; others appear directed more at securing information and advice as an aid to policy-making.