“... Petitioner here contests the findings that the continuation of the strike would imperil the national health and safety. The parties dispute the meaning of the statutory term ‘national health’; the Government insists that the term comprehends the country’s general well-being, its economic health; petitioner urges that simply the physical health of the citizenry is meant. We need not resolve this question, for we think the judgment ... is amply supported on the ground that the strike imperils the national safety. Here we rely upon the evidence of the strike’s effect on specific defense projects; we need not pass on the Government’s contention that ‘national safety’ in this context should be given a broader construction and application. “... The statute was designed to provide a public remedy in times of emergency; we cannot construe it to require that the United States either formulate a reorganization of the affected industry to satisfy its defense needs without the complete reopening of closed facilities, or demonstrate in court the unfeasibility of such a reorganization. There is no room in the statute for this requirement which the petitioner seeks to impose on the Government.”[812] The steel strike was finally settled on January 4, 1960, following all-night negotiations between the Vice-President, the Secretary of Labor, representatives of the steel companies and representatives of the steel companies and representatives of the steelworker’s union. Vice-President Nixon and Secretary of Labor Mitchell, acting under instructions from President Eisenhower, had been conducting negotiations for several weeks with the parties to the dispute. While all parties involved were gratified to have this long and costly strike ended, the method of settlement does not confirm the efficacy of the emergency provision of the Taft-Hartley Act. Indeed, it is further confirmation of the fact that the American approach to emergency powers has imposed upon successive executives, not only the incentive, but the absolute need to resort to extra-statutory means for settling emergencies. CHAPTER XI CONCLUSIONS The doctrine of constitutional dictatorship is inappropriate for analysis of the problem of democratic response to emergency. Judicial review of a chief executive’s finding that an emergency exists amounts to involvement of Supreme Court Justices in a genre of decision-making which should more properly be performed by the President and Congress, although the 1959 Steel Seizure decision reveals the effective role which the Supreme Court may play in holding the President to the forms of emergency action prescribed by the Congress, if the Congress has so prescribed them.