The recurrent trouble which the nation has confronted in taking timely and effective emergency action at the national level stems from the existence on the statute books of a confusing array of provisions for the declaration of various kinds of emergency, and the excessively precise definition of the techniques which must be employed in coping with the emergency. This invites efforts at evasion of statutory limitations as in the instance of the 1952 steel strike, or requires recurrent special legislation dealing with successive particularized emergencies. Also, in forewarning the private parties in dispute, in the case of a strike, of the precise time-table and program of action to which the executive must adhere, it may lessen their incentive to settle the dispute, for the course of action prescribed by statute may, depending upon the situation, strengthen the bargaining position of one of the disputants. The recent use of the concurrent resolution in Congress provides a key to the means for equipping the President with the broad discretion he should have to identify conditions warranting emergency action, and to select the appropriate tools to deal with an emergency, while simultaneously keeping him under Congressional surveillance and control. We propose a generic statute to empower the President to proclaim a national or regional emergency. Under such a proclamation the President may issue rules and regulations which have the force of law. A proclamation of emergency would be placed before the Congress within twenty-four hours of its issuance. If Congress were not in session, it would be called into session within five days from the time of the declaration of emergency. The proclamation of emergency would stand unless revoked by concurrent resolution by both Houses of Congress within five days of Congress’ coming into special session. The rules and regulations issued under the proclamation would be similarly subject to revocation by concurrent resolution and Congress should possess the item veto in this respect; i.e., it may revoke one rule, while permitting others to stand. An emergency proclamation and regulations issued under it, would automatically expire after thirty days, but would be subject to reissuance by the President, provided the Congress concurred. Congress, upon the issuance of an emergency proclamation would establish a scrutiny committee on emergency powers, patterned after the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Congress would maintain continuous scrutiny of the administration of powers exercised under the proclamation. The Committee’s primary responsibility would be to keep Congress sufficiently advised as to whether powers had been responsibly administered. There is nothing novel about this proposal. The British have operated under similar statutes in peace and war for fifty years with a record of great success in two respects: