Cornelius P. Cotter began his academic career at Stanford University in 1946 following three years as a Navy Seabee in the Pacific during the Second World War. He received his A.B. in 1949 from Stanford, and an M.P.A. (1951) and Ph.D. in government (1953) from Harvard University. He was a Sheldon Travelling Fellow from Harvard University to the University of London from 1951-52. After serving as Instructor in Government at Columbia University 1952-53, he returned to his alma mater, Stanford, in 1953 as an Assistant Professor of Political Science. He is currently on leave as an Associate Professor from Stanford University to serve as a special assistant to the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Senator Thruston B. Morton. From December 1958 to December 1959, he served as the Citizenship Clearinghouse Fellow to the Republican National Committee. The authors have contributed to the Western Political Quarterly, Stanford Law Review, the Journal of Politics, and the Midwestern Political Science Review. Currently they are collaborating on a textbook in American Government. This study of presidential emergency powers was initiated by the authors in 1955 while teaching at Stanford and the University of California; revision and expansion were undertaken in Washington, D. C., during 1959 and 1960. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The general welfare, and military effectiveness of a modern industrial nation depend upon the harmonious interaction of a complex, interdependent network of production and transportation facilities. The interruption of this process at any of a myriad of critical points can disrupt the supply of essential civilian and military materials, possibly undermining the economic health or military security of the nation.[1] The urban concentration of population and the refinement of communication devices and techniques for manipulating public opinion make it increasingly possible to instill in the civilian population an hysteria and terror which could effectively thwart national mobilization.[2] Realization of the magnitude of the problem, and a pervasive fear of military assault, vitally influence the process of continuous redefinition of the balance between collective authority and individual liberty which is the essential task of democratic government in war as in peace. Emergency government has become the norm for twentieth century constitutional states.