_Intelligence_: The obvious example here is the statute setting up the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947. Its Director was intrusted with responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure and for operating an American intelligence network.[552] PROTECTING FREEDOM OF COMMUNICATION It would be distorting the picture not to take into account those instances in which Congress displayed concern lest the control programs it enacted would constrict freedom of communication. Thus while the Price administrator had the power to require licenses of anybody selling commodities regulated by his office, his power did not extend to various media of communication. The selling or distributing of newspapers, periodicals, books or printed or written material, motion pictures or radio time were exempted from the license requirement.[553] The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951 permits any member of the Armed Forces to communicate directly or indirectly with any Member of Congress. The statute expressly forbids any one from restricting or preventing a serviceman from writing to his Congressman or Senator. The only limitation placed on such communication is that the subject matter does not violate the law or the regulations necessary to the security and safety of the United States.[554] CHAPTER VIII LEGISLATIVE RESTRAINTS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF EMERGENCY POWERS It is generally conceded that the problem of the responsibility of administrative officials in a democracy is the very crux of the problem of the maintenance of the democratic system,[555] and that we must look chiefly to the Congress for performance of the task of happily combining administrative responsibility with the administrative discretion so vital to the maintenance of the democratic government in time of peace or war. Members and critics of the federal legislature, particularly since the 77th or first wartime Congress (1941-1942), have acknowledged and responded to the need to equip it more effectively to formulate basic policy as well as to scrutinize administrative execution of the legislative mandate.[556] As appraised by these critics the problem is one of adequately and accurately informing the Congress,[557] of concentrating congressional checks upon essentials rather than trivia,[558] and, in contradiction of those who seek an unchecked executive discretion in time of emergency, of “including closer, stronger, steadier cooperation between the President and the Congress.”[559]