(3) “A widely current opinion during the last quarter of a century has been that _‘reasonableness’ is not a good in itself, but only for the sake of something_. Whether it be so or not seems to be a synthetical question [_i.e._ a question that is not merely a verbal question, a question of words], not to be settled by an appeal to the Principle of Contradiction [the principle hitherto relied upon by Rationalism or Intellectualism].... Almost everybody will now agree that the ultimate good lies in the evolutionary process in some way. If so, it is not in individual reactions in their segregation, but in something general or continuous. Synechism is founded on the notion that the coalescence, the becoming continuous, the becoming governed by laws, the becoming instinct with general ideas, are but phases of one and the same process of the growth of reasonableness” (_ibid._ p. 322. From Dr. Peirce, the bracket clauses being the author’s). (4) “It is the belief that ideas invariably strive after practical expression, and that our whole life is teleological. Putting the matter logically, logic formulates theoretically what is of regulative importance for life--for our ‘experience’ in view of practical ends. Its philosophical meaning is the conviction that all facts of nature, physically and spiritually, find their expressions in ‘_will_’; will and energy are identical. This tendency is in agreement with the practical tendencies of American thought and American life in so far as they both set a definite end before Idealism” (Ueberweg-Heinze, _Geschichte der Philosophie_, vol. iv., written and contributed by Professor Matoon Monroe Curtis, Professor of Philosophy in Western Reserve University, Cleveland, U.S.A.). (5) See also an article in _Mind_ for October 1900, vol. ix. N.S., upon “Pragmatism” by the author of this book on _Pragmatism and Idealism_, referred to as one of the early sources in Baldwin’s _Philosophical Dictionary_ (New York and London) and in Ueberweg-Heinze’s _Geschichte_, Vierter Teil (Berlin, 1906). The conclusion that I am inclined to draw from the foregoing official statements (and also, say, from another official article like that of M. Lalande in the _Revue Philosophique_, 1906, on “Pragmatisme et Pragmaticisme”) is that the _term_ “Pragmatism” is not of itself a matter of great importance, and that there is no separate, intelligible, independent, self-consistent system of philosophy that may be called Pragmatism. It is a general name for the Practicalism or Voluntarism or Humanism or the Philosophy of the Practical Reason, or the Activism, or the Instrumentalism, or the Philosophy of Hypotheses, or the Dynamic Philosophy of life and things that is discussed in different ways in this book upon Pragmatism and Idealism. And it is not and cannot be independent of the traditional body of philosophical truth in relation to which it can alone be defined. CHAPTER II PRAGMATISM AND THE PRAGMATIST MOVEMENT