[184] It is, I think, an important reflection that it is precisely in this very reality of “action” that science and philosophy come together. That all the sciences meet in the concept, or the fact, of action is, of course, quite evident from the new knowledge of the new physics. Professor M’Dougall has recently brought psychology into line with the natural sciences by defining its subject-matter as the actions or the “behaviour” of human beings and animals. And it is surely not difficult to see that--as I try to indicate--it is in human behaviour that philosophy and science come together. Another consideration in respect of the philosophy of action that has long impressed me is this. If there is one realm in which, more than anywhere else, our traditional rationalism and our traditional empiricism really came together in England, it is the realm of social philosophy, the realm of human activity. It was the breaking down of the entire philosophy of sensations in the matter of the proof of utilitarianism that caused John Stuart Mill to take up the “social philosophy” in respect to which the followers of positivism joined hands with the idealists. [185] See p. 185. [186] See p. 27. [187] See Chapter VII. p. 179. [188] I am thinking of Pyrrho and Arcesilaus and some of the Greek sceptics and of their ἐποχή and ἀταραξία. [189] See p. 26. [190] _Man’s Place in the Cosmos_, a book consisting of essays and reviews published by the author during the last four or five years. They all advocate “humanism in opposition to naturalism,” or “ethicism in opposition to a too narrow intellectualism.” [191] _The Will to Believe_, 1897. [192] “Progress in Philosophy,” art. _Mind_, 15, p. 213. [193] _Practical Ethics_; Essays. [194] _Mental Development--Social and Ethical Interpretations_ (a work crowned by the Royal Academy of Denmark). We can see in this book how a psychologist has been led into a far-reaching study of social and ethical development in order to gain an understanding of the growth of even the individual mind. We may indeed say that the individualistic intellectualism of the older psychology is now no more. It was too “abstract” a way of looking at mind. Professor Royce, it is well known, has given, from the stand-point of a professed metaphysician, a cordial welcome to the work of Professor Baldwin. In an important review of Mr. Stout’s two admirable volumes on _Analytic Psychology_ (_Mind_, July, 1897), Professor Royce has insisted strongly upon the need of supplementing introspection by the “interpretation of the reports and the conduct of other people” if we would know much about “dynamic” psychology. It is this “dynamic” psychology--the “dynamics” of the will and of the “feelings”--that I think constitutes such an important advance upon the traditional “intellectual” and “individualistic” psychology.