Turning, then, to France, it is, judging from the claims of the pragmatists, and from some of the literature bearing upon this entire subject,[43] fairly evident that there has been a kind of association or relationship between Pragmatism and the following tendencies in recent French philosophy: (1) the “freedom” and “indeterminism” philosophy of Renouvier[44] and other members of the Neo-Critical school, and of Boutroux and Bergson, who, “although differing from each other in many important respects,” all “belong to the same movement of thought, the reaction against Hegelianism and the cult of science which has dominated France since the decline of the metaphysics of the school of Cousin”;[45] (2) the philosophy of science and scientific hypotheses represented by writers like Poincaré,[46] Brunschvicg, Le Roy,[47] Milhaud, Abel Rey,[48] and others; (3) the religious philosophy and the fideism of the followers of the spiritualistic metaphysic of Bergson, many of whom go further than he does, and “make every effort to bring him to the confessional faith”;[49] and (4) the French philosophy of to-day that definitely bears the name of Pragmatism, that of M. Blondel,[50] who in 1893 wrote a suggestive work entitled _L’Action_, and who claims to have coined the word Pragmatism, after much careful consideration and discrimination, as early as 1888--many years before the California pamphlet of James. The first of these points of correspondence or relationship we can pass over with the remark that we shall have a good deal to say about the advantage enjoyed by Pragmatism over Rationalism in the treatment of “freedom” and the “volitional” side of human nature, and also about the general pragmatist reaction against Rationalism. And as for the philosophy of science, it has been shown that our English-speaking pragmatists cannot exactly pride themselves in the somewhat indiscriminate manner of James and Schiller upon the supposed support for their “hypothetical” conception of science and philosophy to be found in the work of their French associates upon the logic of science. “The men of great learning who were named as sponsors of this new philosophy have more and more testified what reservations they make, and how greatly their conclusions differ from those which are currently attributed to them.”[51] Both Brunschvicg and Poincaré, in fact, take the greatest pains in their books to dissociate themselves from anything like the appearance of an acceptance of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge, from the signs of any lack of faith in the idea that science, as far as it goes, gives us a true revelation of the nature of reality.