As for Pragmatism and pragmatist achievements in Germany, there is, as might well be supposed, little need of saying much. The genius of the country is against both; and if there is any Pragmatism in Germany, it must have contrived somehow to have been “born again” of the “spirit” before obtaining official recognition.[66] So much even might be inferred from the otherwise generous recognition accorded to the work of James by scholars and thinkers like Eucken and Stein[67] and the rest. Those men cannot see Pragmatism save in the broad light of the “humanism” that has always characterised philosophy, when properly appreciated, and understood in the light of its true genesis. Pragmatism has in fact been long known in Germany under the older names of “Voluntarism” and “Humanism,” although it may doubtless be associated there with some of the more pronounced tendencies of the hour, such as the recent insistence of the “Göttingen Fries School” upon the importance of the “genetic” and the “descriptive” point of view in regard even to the matter of the supposed first principles of knowledge, the hypothetical and methodological conception of philosophy taken by philosophical scientists like Mach and Ostwald[68] and their followers, the “empiricism” and “realism” of thinkers like the late Dr. Avenarius[69] of Zurich. Then the so-called “teleological,” or “practical,” character of our human thinking has also been recognized in modern German thought long before the days of Peirce and Dewey, even by such strictly academic thinkers as Lotze and Sigwart. The work of the latter thinker upon Logic, by the way, was translated into English under distinctly Neo-Hegelian influences. In the second portion of this work the universal presuppositions of knowledge are considered, not merely as _a priori_ truths, but as akin in some important respects “to the ethical principles by which we are wont to determine and guide our free conscious activity.”[70] But even apart from this matter of the natural association of Pragmatism with the Voluntarism that has long existed in German philosophy,[71] we may undoubtedly pass to the following things in contemporary and recent German thought as sympathetic, in the main, to the pragmatist tendencies of James and Dewey and Schiller: (1) the practical conception of science and philosophy, as both of them a kind of “economy of the attention,” a sort of “conceptual shorthand”[72] (for the purposes of the “description” of our environment) that we have referred to in the case of Mach and Ostwald; (2) the close association between the “metaphysical” and the “cultural” in books like those of Jerusalem[73] and Eleutheropulos;[74] (3) the sharp criticism of the Rationalism of the Critical Idealism by the two last-mentioned thinkers, and by some of the members of the new Fichte[75] School like Schellwien; and last but not least, (4) the tendency to take a psychological[76] and a sociological[77] (instead of a merely logical)