What is now taking place in America in this second decade [_i.e._ in the years after 1908] of the pragmatist movement is apparently (1) the sharpest kind of official rationalist condemnation of Pragmatism as an imperfectly proved and a merely “subjective” and a highly unsystematic philosophy; (2) the appearance of a number of instructive booklets[93] upon Pragmatism and the pragmatist movement, some of them expository and critical, some of them in the main sympathetic, some of them condemnatory and even contemptuous, and some of them attempts at further constructive work along pragmatist lines; (3) indications here and there of the acceptance and the promulgation of older and newer doctrines antithetic and hostile to Pragmatism--some of them possibly as typically American as Pragmatism itself. As a single illustration of the partly constructive work that is being attempted in the name and the spirit of pragmatism, we may instance the line of reflection entered upon by Professor Moore[94] in consequence of his claim that to Pragmatism the fundamental thing in any judgment or proposition is not so much its consequences, but its “value.” This claim may, no doubt, be supported by the many declarations of James and Schiller that the “true,” like the “good” and the “beautiful,” is simply a “valuation,” and not the fetish that the rationalists make it out to be. It is doubtful, however, as we may try to indicate, whether this “value” interpretation of Pragmatism can be carried out independently of the more systematic attempts at a general philosophy of value that are being made to-day in Germany and America and elsewhere. And then it would be a matter of no ordinary difficulty to clear up the inconsistency that doubtless exists between Pragmatism as a value philosophy and Pragmatism as a mere philosophy of “consequences.” It is “immediate,” and “verifiable,” and “definitely appreciated” consequences, rather than the higher values of our experience that (up to the present time) seem to have bulked largely in the argumentations of the pragmatists. And as an illustration of a doctrine that is both American and hostile to pragmatism, we may instance the New Realism[95] that was recently launched in a collective manifesto in _The Journal of Philosophy and Scientific Methods_. This realism is, to be sure, hostile to every form of “subjectivism” or personalism, and may in a certain sense be regarded as the emergence into full daylight of the realism or dualism that we found to be lurking[96] in James’s “radical empiricism.” It is, therefore, as it were, one of the signs that Pragmatism is perhaps breaking up in America into some of the more elemental tendencies out of which it developed--in this case the American desire for operative (or effective) realism and for a “direct”[97] contact with reality instead of the indirect contact of so many metaphysical systems.