Philosophers, as well as other men, often exchange (in the words of Lecky) the “love of truth” as such for the love of “_the_ truth,” that is to say, for the love of the system and the social arrangements that best suit their interests as thinkers. And they too are just as eager as other men for discipleship and influence and honour. Knowledge with them, in other words, means, as Bacon put it, “control”; and even with them it does not, and cannot, remain at the stage of mere cognition. It becomes in the end a conviction or a belief. And thus the philosopher with his system (even a Plato, or a Hegel) is after all but a part of the universe, to be judged as such, along with other lives and other systems--a circumstance hit off early in the nineteenth century by German students when they used to talk of one’s being able (in Berlin) to see the _Welt-Geist_ (Hegel) “taking a walk” in the _Thiergarten_. Reality again, so far as either life or science is concerned, means for every man that in which he is most fundamentally interested--ions and radium to the physicist of the hour, life to the biologist, God to the theologian, progress to the philanthropist, and so on. Further, mankind in general is not likely to abandon its habit of estimating all systems of thought and philosophy from the point of view of their value as keys, or aids, to the problem of the meaning and the development of life as a whole. There is no abstract “truth” or “good” or “beauty” apart from the lives of beings who contemplate, and who seek to create, such things as truth and goodness and beauty. To understand knowledge and intellect, again, we must indeed look at them in their actual development in connexion with the total vital or personal activity either of the average or even of the exceptional individual. And instead of regarding the affections and the emotions as inimical to knowledge, or as secondary and inferior to it, we ought to remember that they rest in general upon a broader and deeper attitude to reality than does either the perception of the senses[127] or the critical analysis of the understanding. In both of these cases is the knowledge that we attain to limited in the main either to what is before us under the conditions of time and space, or to particular aspects of things that we mark off, or separate, from the totality of things. As Bergson reminds us, we “desire” and “will” with the “whole” of our past, but “think” only with “part” of it. Small wonder then that James seeks to connect such a broad phenomenon as religion with many of the unconscious factors (they are not all merely “biological”) in the depth of our personality. Some of the instincts and the phenomena that we encounter there are things that transcend altogether the world that is within the scope of our senses or the reasoning faculties.