“The new philosophy,” proceeds Bawden,[153] “is a pragmatic idealism. Its method is at once intrinsic and immanent and organic or functional. By saying that its method is functional, we mean that its experience must be interpreted from within. We cannot jump out of our skins ... we cannot pull ourselves up by our own bootstraps. We find ourselves in mid-stream of the Niagara of experience, and may define what it is by working back and forth within the current.” “We do not know where we are going, but we are on the way” [the contradiction is surely apparent]. Then, like James, Bawden goes on to interpret Pragmatism by showing what things like self-consciousness, experience, science, social consciousness, space, time, and causation _are_ by showing how they “appear,” and how they “function”--“experience” itself being simply, to him and to his friends, a “dynamic system,” “self-sustaining,” a “whole leaning on nothing.” The extremes of this “immediate” or “radical” philosophy appear to non-pragmatists to be reached when we read words like those just quoted about the Niagara stream of our experience, and about our life as simply movement and acceleration, or about the celebrated “I think” of Descartes as equally well [!] set forth under the form “It thinks,” or “thinking is going on,” or about the “being” of the individual person as consisting simply in a “doing.” “All this we hold,” says Bawden, “_to be not materialism but simply energism_.” “There is no ‘truth,’ only ‘truths’--this is another way of putting it--and the only criterion of truth is the changing one of the image or the idea which comes out of our impulses or of the conflict of our habits.” The end of all this modern flowing philosophy is, of course, the “Pluralism” of James, the universe as a society of functioning selves in which reality “may exist in a distributive form, or in the shape, not of an All, but of a set of eaches.” “The essence of life,” as he puts it in his famous essay on Bergson,[154] “is its continually changing character,” and we only call it a “confusion” sometimes because we have grown accustomed in our sciences and philosophies to isolate “elements” and “differents” which in reality are “all dissolved in one another.”[155] “Relations of every sort, of time, space, difference, likeness, change, rate, cause, or what not, are just as integral members of the sensational flux as terms are.” “Pluralism lets things really exist in the each form, or distributively. Its type of union ... is different from the monistic type of all-_einheit_. It is what I call the strung-along type, the type of continuity, contiguity, or concatenation.” And so on.