A broad, pervading inconsistency[333] in “Individuality and Value” which militates somewhat seriously against the idea of its being regarded as a tenable philosophy, is the obvious one between the position (1) that true reality is necessarily individual, and the position (2) that reality is to be found in the “universal” (or the “concept”) of logic.[334] It would, however, perhaps be unfair to expect Dr. Bosanquet to effect a harmony between these two positions that Aristotle (who held them both) was himself very largely unable to do. There is, in other words, a standing and a lasting contradiction between any and all philosophy which holds that it is _reason_ [or _logic_] _alone that attains to truth_ and reality, and the apparently natural and inevitable tendency of the human mind [it is represented in Dr. Bosanquet’s own procedure] to seek after “reality” in the “individual” thing, or person, or being, and in the perfecting of “individuality” in God (or in a kingdom of perfected individuals). The positive errors, however, which we would venture to refer to as even more fatal to Dr. Bosanquet’s book than any of its incidental inconsistencies are those connected with the following pieces of procedure on his part: (1) his manifest tendency to treat the “universal” as if it were an entity on its own account with a sort of development and “value” and “culmination” of its own;[335] (2) his tendency to talk and think as if a “characteristic” or a “predicate” (_i.e._ the “characteristic” or “quality” that some experiencing being or some thinker attributes to reality) could be treated as anything at all _apart from the action and the reaction of this “experient”_ (or “thinker”) _conceived as an agent_; (3) the tendency to talk of “minds”[336] _rather than persons_, as “purposing” and “desiring” things; (4) his tendency to talk as if “teleology” were “wholeness”; (5) his tendency to regard (somewhat in the manner of Spinoza) “selves” and “persons” as like “rising and falling tides,” and of the self as a “world of content”[337] engaged in certain “transformations”; and (6) his tendency to think and speak _as if demonstration_ [“mediation” is perhaps his favourite way of thinking of the logical process] _were an end in itself, as if we lived to think, instead of thinking to live_.